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I. INTRODUCTION
rom their beginning, spouse-based immigration laws bore the
legacies of the doctrine of coverture and its related doctrine,
chastisement.! Coverture established total power and control over a
wife by a husband and chastisement allowed the punishment of a wife by a
husband to force obedience to that power.2 Spouse-based immigration has
been and continues to be predominately female. In the decade from 1990
to 2000, there was substantial legislation affecting spouse-based
immigration. The changes were the result of a combination of factors,
including vigilant lobbying on the part of advocates for abused immigrant
women, and the recognition by congressional representatives of the federal
responsibility for violence against women in the immigration area.
In this decade, Congress confronted the notion of chastisement and
enacted some avenues for relief for abused immigrant spouses. However,
the basic coverture concept of spousal power and control over immigration
status was not rejected. Moreover, the legislative changes assisting abused
1. See Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of
Coverture, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REv 593 (1991), reprinted in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM (Adrien
Katherine Wing ed., New York University Press 1997).
2. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430
(1966). "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage .. .and her condition
during her marriage is called her coverture." Id. at 430.
For as he [husband] is to answer for her [wife's] misbehavior, the law
thought it reasonable to intrust him with this power of restraining her,
by domestic chastisement . . . and the courts of law will still permit a
husband to restrain a wife of her liberty, in case of any gross
misbehavior.
Id. at 432-33. See also NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND
PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK 17 (1982).
[Vol. 24
A DECADE OF SPOUSE-BASED IMMIGRATION LAWS
women are not secure, particularly in the post 9/11 view of immigration.
The legislature did not firmly and finally reject the legal sanction and
enforcement of the control of one spouse over another. Such a failure
perpetuates the inequality of women and provides the basis for violence
against them.
This article begins with a description of spouse-based immigration
and the concept of spouse under the immigration laws. This is followed by
a brief overview of the legal notions of chastisement. The congressional
view of domestic violence in the United States follows. Coverture notions
in the immigration law are explained and the article then describes the
proposals and the changes in the law over the decade from 1990-2000. The
legislative changes addressing spouse-based immigration are then assessed:
first, to determine to what extent coverture notions of spousal power and
control remain and second, to determine the degree to which issues
underlying spouse abuse have been addressed in the context of expressed
congressional goals.
This article concludes that the legacies of coverture and the resulting
legal inequality of women remain. First, the power to petition, which
controls the ability of a non-citizen spouse to live and work and have
custody of children in the United States, is basically still the prerogative of
a citizen or resident spouse. Second, the mail-order-bride business
continues without significant limitation on the ability of citizens or
residents to dominate and abuse their immigrant wives. Third, while some
avenues of relief have been afforded to abused spouses, these changes are
insecure because the legislative goal of rejecting domestic violence
frequently slips from the legislative consciousness and has been sacrificed
to other objectives. Coverture in spouse-based immigration has not met its
demise and the law, therefore, continues to sanction the domination of
husbands over wives and the underlying gender inequality that it promotes.
I. WHAT IS SPOUSE-BASED IMMIGRATION AND WHO IS A SPOUSE?
The immigration law's statutory scheme affords spouses of United
States citizens and sVouses of permanent residents eligibility to become
permanent residents. A permanent resident can live and work in the
3. 8 U.S.C. §§ l151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a)(2) (2000). See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1)
(stating "aliens born in a foreign state or dependent area who may be issued immigrant visas
or who may otherwise acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted to the United States
for permanent residence" include "family-sponsored immigrants"); 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)
(2000) (stating "family-sponsored immigrants" include "spouses. . . of permanent resident
aliens"); 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (exempting "immediate relatives" from
2004]
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United States indefinitely and, after three years, can apply to a become
naturalized citizen if a spouse.n Spouses of citizens are "immediate
relatives" and are not subjected to yearly numerical quotas. Furthermore, a
fiancee of a United States citizen may obtain a special visa that allows her
to enter the United States to conclude a valid marriage with a citizen within
ninety days of entry.5 Spouses of permanent residents are subjected to
6yearly quotas.
Statistically, spouse-based immigration is a significant component of
immigration into the United States.7 The number of spouses of United
States citizens legally admitted to the country from 1990 to 1999 ranged
from approximately 120,000 to 170,000 per year while the number of
spouses of permanent residents admitted each year ranged from
approximately 30,000 to 60,000 each year.8 Women make up the majority
of immigrating spouses. For example in 1997, sixty-six percent of the total
number of spouses immigrating through marriage were women.9 Sixty-one
percent of the immigrating spouses of U.S. citizens were women in 1997:
105,000 out of 170,000. A higher proportion (eighty-seven percent) of the
spouses of legal permanent residents were women: 28,000 out of 32,000.10
Women also comprised the majority of fiancres granted visas; from 1990
to 1997, the yearly average of fiancres has been 6,400, of which about
seventy-nine percent were women. "
The ability of the non-citizen spouse to immigrate and become a legal
resident is controlled by the citizen or resident spouse in most
circumstances. The general process for becoming a spouse-based
permanent resident requires that the citizen or resident spouse file a
petition,12 (unless the alien spouse fits into an exception that allows her to
numerical limitations and defining immediate relatives to include the spouses of a citizen of
the United States).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (2000).
5. 8 U.S.C. § I 10](a)(15)(K) (2000).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2000).
7. Overall, spouses of United States citizens comprised about twenty-five percent
of all immigrants legally admitted to the United States each year during the last quarter of
the twentieth century. FRANK BEAN, AMERICA'S NEWCOMERS 197 (2003).
8. FRANK BEAN, AMERICA'S NEWCOMERS 183, fig. 8.2 (2003).
9. International Matchmaking Organizations: A Report to Congress 6, available at




12. 8 U.S.C. §§ I 154(a)(I)(A)(i), I 154(a)(l)(B)(i) (2000); 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (setting
the procedure for granting immigrant status); 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (requiring a petitioning
procedure); 8 U.S.C. § I 154(a)(I)(A)(i) (stating "any citizen of the United States claiming
that an alien is entitled to ... an immediate relative status under section 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i) of
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self-petition.) 13 The petition is assessed to determine whether the requisite
spousal relationship exists or existed.14 If the petition is approved, then the
alien spouse must demonstrate that she is not excludable from the country
on a variety of grounds such as health and income status, past criminal
behavior, and violation of immigration law.' 5 She then becomes a legal
resident either on a permanent or conditional basis.16
If the marriage is less than two years, the alien spouse becomes a
resident on a conditional basis.17 If the condition is not removed after two
years, then the resident status lapses and the alien spouse is an unauthorized
alien.' 8 The removal of the condition generally requires a joint petition by
both spouses, but there are some exceptions as explained below.' 9
This article addresses the notions of spouse-based immigration within
the confines of the existing concept of spouse: a monogamous, not
incestuous, male-female, legally sanctioned relationship. The immigration
law as interpreted by the executive and judiciary has a particular view of
who is a spouse. The marriage must be legally valid, and not against public
this title may file a petition with the Attorney General for such classification"); 8 U.S.C. §
1154(a)(l)(B)(i) (stating "[any alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence claiming
that an alien is entitled to a classification by reason of the relationship described in section
1153(a)(2) of this title may file a petition with the Attorney General for such
classification").
13. 8 U.S.C. §§ I 154(a)(l)(A)(iii); I 154(a)(I)(B)(ii)(I) (2000). The language of the
exception requiring the citizen or resident to file a petition for a spouse is the same in 8
U.S.C. § l154(a)(l)(A)(iii) relating to spouses of United States Citizens and 8 U.S.C. §
! 154(a)(I)(B)(ii)(I) relating to spouses of permanent residents:
If the alien demonstrates to the Attorney General that - (aa) the marriage
or the intent to marry the United States citizen was entered into in good
faith by the alien; and (bb) during the marriage or relationship intended
by the alien to be legally a marriage, the alien or a child of the alien has
been battered or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by
the alien's spouse or intended spouse.
8 U.S.C. § I 154(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I).
14. See Immigration and Naturalization Service Form 1-130, Petition for Alien
Relative, 8 C.F.R. § 204.2 (2000).
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2000); 8 CFR §§ 245. I(a); 245.2(a) (2000).
16. Family based immigration is also a feature of the non-immigrant component of
the system. Non-immigrants are persons allowed to come to the United States for a variety
of "temporary" purposes including work, studying, and doing business. The spouses and
children of some non-immigrants are allowed to accompany the non-immigrant in a status
that is totally dependant on the non-immigrant. 2 MAILMAN ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 12.03(l)(e) (2003).
17. 8 U.S.C. § I 186a(l) (2000).
18. 8 U.S.C. § I I86a(c) (2000).
19. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186a, 1186a(c)(4) (2000); SARAH IGNATIUS & ELISABETH
STICKNEY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE FAMILY §§ 5.1-5.60 (2002). See infra note 98.
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policy, and not entered into for the sole purpose of obtaining immigration
status.
To determine whether the marriage is legally valid, the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) 20 will assess whether the
marriage was valid in the place it was performed.2' However, if the
marriage was performed in a place to avoid restrictions of the place of
residence, then the marriage will be recognized only to the extent the place
of residence would recognize the marriage.22 Common law marriages,
customary marriages and purely religious marriages are considered legal
marriages if they are considered legal in the state or country in which they
were performed.23
Certain marriages, even if legal in the place performed, are not
recognized for "public policy" reasons. Incestuous marriages are generally
not recognized. However, since incest laws differ state to state, the Board
of Immigration Appeals has recognized a marriage prohibited by the incest
laws of a state when that state will give full faith and credit to a marriage
performed in another state even if that marriage is in violation of the first
state's incest laws.24 Proxy marriages are barred by statute as the basis for
immigration status unless the marriage has been consummated.25
Polygamous marriages have generally not been recognized. However,
in 1990 the exclusion ground for persons who "practice or have even
practiced" polygamy was changed to exclude only those "coming to the
20. The familiar INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service, has been disbanded
and reorganized. The current most relevant agency to this topic is named USCIS, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services. http://uscis.gov. The Homeland Security Act of
2002 abolished the INS. Pub.L. No. 107-296 § 471, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). It initiated a
mammoth governmental reorganization, transferring the majority of the INS's functions
from the Department of Justice (DOJ) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), but
leaving the Executive Office of Immigration Review (including the immigration judges and
BIA, Board of Immigration Appeals) under the auspices of the DOJ.
21. See In re Luna, 18 1. & N. Dec. 385 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals 1983).
22. See In re E, 4 1. & N. Dec. 239 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals 1956) (recognizing
a marriage between an uncle and a niece because the state of their residence gave full faith
and credit to the marriage performed in another state). But see In re G, 6 I. & N. Dec. 337
(Bd. of Immigration Appeals 1954) (finding a legal marriage between a niece and uncle that
took place in Italy was not recognized because their state of residence, Pennsylvania, did not
recognize the marriage).
23. See In re Garcia, 16 I. & N. Dec. 623 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals 1978); In re
Annang, 14 I. & N. Dec. 502 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals 1973); In re Leon, 15 I. & N.
Dec. 248 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals 1975).
24. IGNATIUS & STICKNEY, supra note 19, at 4-22.
25. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(35) (2000). But See 9 FOREIGN APP. MANUAL n.10.1 to 22
C.F.R. § 42.41 (2003) (permitting the issuance of a visitor's visas to an alien married by
proxy to come to the United States to consummate the marriage).
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United States to practice polygamy. ' 26 The spouse who consents to her
spouse being married to more than one person has been considered to be a
practicing polygamist and excludable, as well as the spouse who marries
more than one wife. Administratively, the polygamist's first marriage will
be recognized, and the first wife will be able to obtain immigration status,
but a subsequent spouse will not be recognized unless all the marriages that
preceded her have been terminated.27
Same-sex marriages were held to be against public policy in a 1983
Ninth Circuit case, and, therefore, were not considered as the basis for
spouse-based immigration even if legal in the place in which the marriage
was performed.28  This has been the continuing administrative
interpretation. 29 However, the issue of same-sex marriage is a developing
area of the law.30  Recent developments question whether same-sex
marriages can continue to be considered against public policy, including
the removal of homosexuality as a ground for exclusion in 1990,3' the
Supreme Court's decision holding unconstitutional laws that criminalize
same-sex intimacy in private homes32 and state court decisions finding
prohibitions on same-sex marriage unconstitutional.33 However, in reaction
to the possibility of states recognizing same-sex marriages, Congress
enacted the Defense of Marriage Act, which provides that the federal
government will only recognize marriages between members of the
opposite sex.34 This seemingly would allow the Bureau of Citizenship and
Immigration Services to not recognize same-sex marriages, even if legal
when performed in other countries or in a state in the United States.
Even if a marriage is legal and not against public policy, it is not valid
for immigration purposes if it was entered into solely for the purpose of
obtaining immigration status. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to
demonstrate that the principal purpose of the marriage was to make a life
together, that the marriage was "in good faith.,, 3' However, a marriage will
26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(10)(A) (2000).
27. IGNATIUS & STICKNEY, supra note 19, at 4-25 to 4-26.
28. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
29. See generally, May Brownstein, Why Same-Sex Spouses Should be Granted
Preferential Immigration Status: Reevaluating Adams v. Howerton, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 763 (1994).
30. See Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75
TEMP. L. REV. 709, 734-46 (2002).
31. The bar for homosexuals previously in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2000) was
removed by the Immigration Act of 1990.
32. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
33. See Ruthann Robson, supra note 30, at 737-45.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
35. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953); IGNATIUS & STICKNEY, supra
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continue to be recognized as valid if it was valid at its inception but later is
no longer viable, as long as the legal marriage continues.36
II. COVERTURE AND CHASTISEMENT
Spouse-based immigration continues to be predominately female:
laws that affect spouses predominately affect wives. The basic premises of
the coverture and chastisement doctrines continue in the current
immigration law.
Coverture is the legal notion that a husband and wife are one, and the
one is the husband.37 Under the doctrine of coverture, the husband had
ownership rights over his wife and was legally entitled to control his wife's
income, property and residence. Further, the husband had a right to control
his wife's behavior. She was subservient to him and owed him obedience.
If she did not obey, the related notion of chastisement allowed a husband to
discipline his wife, even with physical force. 38 The wife's legal identity
merged with that of her husband to such an extent that she was unable to
file suit for damages or to enforce contracts. Moreover, under coverture,
the children of the marriage were considered marital property and,
therefore, were under the father's control. A mother was entitled to no
power over her children. 39 The law sanctioned the power and control of the
husband over the wife. The legal notion of coverture thus established a
note 19, at 4-28, n.2.
36. A line of BIA, Board of Immigration Appeals, cases had held that an individual
could be barred from obtaining immigration benefits where the marriage was no longer
viable, although valid at its inception. See, e.g., In re Sosa, 15 I. & N. Dec. 572, 574 (Bd. of
Immigration Appeals 1976). However, rulings by the federal courts rejected this position.
Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.D.C.1978); See also Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607
F.2d 868, 869-70 (9th Cir. 1979); Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1975). In
the early eighties, the BIA overturned its previous holdings that the nonviability of a
marriage formed a valid basis for denying immigration benefits. See Matter of Mowrer, 17 I.
& N. Dec. 613, 615 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals 1981); Austin T. Fragomen, et al.,
Continued Validity of the Marriage: The Viability Issue, I IMMIGR. L. & Bus. § 3:20 (2003);
Judith Patterson et al., IRCA, IMFA, and SDCEA: What Does this Immigration Alphabet
Soup Spell?, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 413, 456 (1987); 3 IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE § 36:13.
37. See Calvo, supra note 1.
38. Claudia Zaher, When a Woman's Marital Status Determined Her Legal Status:
A Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 459 (2002).
See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB, BATTERED WOMEN AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1982); M. Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force
and the Force of Law, 69 CAL. L.REV. 1657, 1659 (1981).
39. Calvo, supra note 1, at 596-98; Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards'
Fathers and Good Victims: Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures
of Legal Images, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 561 (2000).
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legal regime that enforced the subordination of one adult human being to
another.4°
Historically, in the domestic law in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the rhetoric of coverture and chastisement were rejected,4' but
the underlying notions of spousal subordination proved to be more
tenacious. 42 As detailed by Reva Siegel, 43 a husband's prerogatives of
power and control and even punishment continued, justified under other
rationales, such as familial privacy, rather than male domination. The
preservation of the prerogative through transforming the rationale was not
necessarily implemented through overt conspiracy or malevolence. While
there were some improvements in the welfare of wives, basic subordination
continued and was revitalized by being reconfigured in less socially
controversial terms. One of these approaches involved cleansing the law of
gender specific references: moving, for example, from "wife" to "spouse."
This, however, did not remove either the prerogatives or the underlying
inequalities, because in reality those subordinated continued to be women.
For example, the rhetorical shift from "wife abuse" to "spouse abuse" did
not change the fact that ninety-five percent or more of those subjected to
spousal violence are wives.44 Serious modern attention by courts and
legislators to the problem of domestic violence began in the 1970s. 45
The coverture and chastisement concepts underlying immigration law
have a similar history, but at a later time period. While challenges to
notions of coverture and chastisement in the domestic law started in the late
nineteenth century, critical attention to these notions in the context of
immigration law did not appear at all until the mid-twentieth century.46 A
major congressional attempt to address these issues did not occur until the
1990s when Congress considered various versions of the Violence Against
Women Act.47
40. Katharine T. Bartlett, Family Law and American Culture: Feminism and
Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 476 (1999).
41. But see Robson, supra note 30, at 773-74 (explaining that even after married
women were able to own property in the later half of the 1 9th century, vestiges of coverture
continued for more than a century).
42. Calvo, supra note 1, at 598-99.
43. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative, 105 YALE
L. 2117 (1996).
44. Id. at 2172.
45. ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000).
46. Calvo, supra note I, at 601-03.
47. See infra Sections C, 2 and 6.
2004]
NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL VIEW OF CHASTISEMENT
In the early 1990s, Congress spent a number of years trying to
understand the societal and legal problem of domestic violence and the
failure of the society and the law to adequately deal with family violence.
Congressional reports inquired into the roles and responsibilities of the law
and legal system, law enforcement, and public attitudes in creating and
perpetuating family violence. Eventually, legislators recognized the
domestic abuse dynamics in the immigration law as well as other legal
areas. Therefore, understanding the congressional view of domestic
violence is important to understanding the legislative responses in the
immigration law and assessing the legislative effort.
In various reports, Congress recognized that "the legal system
historically failed to address violence against women with appropriate
seriousness, and has even accepted it as legitimate. 4 8 One report noted
that under English common law accepted in the United States, a man could
beat his wife as long as he did not use a rod thicker than his thumb.49 Until
the twentieth century, United States society effectively condoned family
violence following the "rule of thumb" rule. This led to a reluctance of
government to interfere to protect women.5° In nineteenth century some
courts explicitly sanctioned the "salutary restraint of domestic discipline.'
In the congressional view, the legacy of this acceptance of family violence
endured through the twentieth century. 2
Congressional reports recognized that the nation's law enforcement
institutions carried the legacy of the law's condoning of wife abuse well
into the later part of the twentieth century. Many jurisdictions refused to
arrest and prosecute spouse abusers.53 Congress found that victims of
abuse sometimes additionally were subjected to trivializing of the problem
by prosecutors and judges, and gender biased attitudes about domestic
violence.54
Congress also found a continuing acceptance of domestic violence in
the attitudes of the society. One report stated, "Violence against women
reflects as much a failure of our nation's collective willingness to confront
the problem as it does the failure of the Nation's laws and regulations.
48. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27 (1993).
49. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27.
50. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993).
51. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 36 (1990).
52. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993).
53. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 36 (1990).
54. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27 (1993).
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Both our resolve and our laws must change if women are to lead free and
equal lives." 15
Congress found the damage wrought by family violence to individuals
and the society as a whole to be profound. It found that spouse abuse is
56serious, chronic, and national in scope. Abuse is not located in one area,
one socio-economic group or with any particular racial, ethnic or religious
group.57 Congressional reports noted that in 1991 at least 21,000 domestic
crimes against women were reported to police every week,58 and that
unreported domestic crimes were estimated to be more than three times
reported crimes.59 Therefore, according to congressional reports three to
four million women in the United States are abused by their husbands each
year.6° The victims of domestic violence are overwhelmingly women.
According to congressional reports, 95% of all domestic violence victims
are women.
6 1
The nature of the violence in the family context as reported by
Congress is severe. Family violence accounts for a significant number of
murders: one-third of all women who are murdered die at the hands of
husbands or boyfriends.62 One-fifth of all reported aggravated assaults
involving bodily injury occurred in domestic situations. 63 According to a
United States Department of Justice report, one-third of domestic attacks
are felony rapes, robberies, or aggravated assaults. Of the remaining two-
thirds, which were simple assaults, almost one-half involved serious bodily
injury.64 Sexual assaults are a major part of family violence. Estimates
indicate that more than one of every six sexual assaults a week is
committed by a family member. Tremendous violence occurs in homes.
While abuse can take the form of an assault, such as hitting the spouse with
55. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993).
56. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 37 (1990).
57. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 37.
58. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993); STAFFOF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
102D CONG., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA III (Comm.
Print 1992).
59. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993).
60. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 30 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26 (1993).
61. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26 (1993).
62. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993).
63. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA 32 (Comm. Print 1992).
64. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993).
65. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102d
Cong., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA 2 (Comm. Print
1992).
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66~the butt of a gun or beating her in the head with a three-inch pipe, it can
also take other forms such as breaking the legs of a pet.67
Along with the severity of the violence, the congressional reports
explicitly recognized important differences between domestic violence and
stranger violence. One report noted that, unlike other crimes, spouse abuse
is chronic violence. It is characterized by persistent intimidation and
repeated physical injury. Absent intervention, it is almost guaranteed "that
,,68the same woman will be assaulted again and again by the same man.
Not only is the abuse repetitive, it escalates over time. One report noted
that police had been called five times previously in over half of murders of
wives by husbands.69 Stalking behavior is also part of the chronic and
repetitive nature of domestic violence. 70 The reports recognized that the
chronic nature of domestic violence led to a number of incidents that
involve violence even after legal protection has been sought and obtained.7'
For example, divorce does not always protect a spouse from abuse.
Women are assaulted by ex-husbands.72
The congressional reports recognized both the terrible human cost and
suffering from domestic violence 73 and the heavy price society pays for this
violence.74 The health care consequences and costs were particularly
noted. Congressional reports recognized that for four years, Surgeons
General warned that family violence posed the single largest threat of
injury to adult women.75 One million women each year seek medical
attention for injuries at hands of male partners.76 One study found sixty-
three percent of victims beaten while pregnant.
77
The impact on children of domestic violence was recognized by
congressional reports as a major concern. Children are the victims of direct
and indirect violence. 78 A child may be the direct victim of violence such
66. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102d Cong., VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA 6 (Comm. Print 1992).
67. Id.
68. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 36 (1990).
69. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 37.
70. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102d Cong., VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA 7 (Comm. Pint 1992).
71. Id.
72. Id. at III, 3, 7.
73. Id. at 4.
74. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993).
75. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41-42.
76. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41; S. REP. No. 101-545, at 37 (1990).
77. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26 (1993).
78. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102d Cong., VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA 7 (Comm. Print 1992).
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as in a sexual assault of a child by a parent.79 A child may also suffer the
harm of being an indirect victim of violence between parents, such as when
the child is present when one spouse abuses the other,8° or when the child
views a rape or beating of their mother by their father.8'
Congressional reports detailed other adverse social consequences of
domestic abuse, such as homelessness 82 and employee absenteeism and
sick time. Suffering violence impairs employment opportunities.83
Estimates are that this society spends five to ten billion dollars a year on
health care, criminal justice and other social costs of domestic violence.
84
Congress acknowledged that prior state and federal efforts had been
insufficient. 85 A federal response was necessary to meet its goals, one that
acknowledged the criminal justice priority as well as treating domestic
violence as a health issue, a shelter issue and a crime victim compensation
issue.86
In the later stages of its inquiry, Congress recognized the immigration
law as one part of a larger failure to confront the domestic violence issue.
One report stated that domestic battery problems are "terribly exacerbated
in marriages where one spouse is not a citizen, and the non-citizens legal
status depends on his or her marriage to the abuser. 87 In the congressional
view, the existing immigration law fostered domestic violence in such
situations by placing control of alien spouse's ability to gain permanent
legal status in the hands of the citizen or legal permanent resident.88 A
battered spouse could be deterred from taking action to protect herself,
such as filing for a civil protection order, filing criminal charges or calling
the police, because of the threat or fear of deportation. 89 "Many immigrant
women live trapped and isolated in violent homes afraid to turn to anyone
for help." They fear continued abuse if they stay and deportation if they
attempt to leave.90
79. Id. at 5, 7.
80. Id. at 5.
81. Id. at7.
82. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 37 (1990).
83. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102d Cong., VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA 6 (Comm. Print 1992).
84. S. REP. No.103-138, at 41 (1993).
85. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 38-39 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25 (1993).
86. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 39 (1990).
87. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26 (1993).
88. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26.
89. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26.
90. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26.
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V. COVERTURE AND CHATISEMENT IN IMMIGRATION LAW
The first immigration laws enacted at the turn of the twentieth century
imposed categorical and numerical limitations on immigration and included
a right of a husband to control his alien wife's immigration status. 9' (The
relationship between a citizen wife and her alien husband was not
recognized.) These early laws established the husband's power to petition
for a wife's immigration status and were based on the common law
doctrine of coverture, which totally subjected a wife to her husband. 92 The
pre-1990 laws moved the rhetoric from "husband" control to "spouse"
control but still maintained the subordination of immigrant wives. The
decade from 1990 to 2000 increasingly addressed the issue of spouse abuse
but not the underlying dynamic of spousal power and control.
A. PRE-1990: ESTABLISHMENT AND MINIMAL RESPONSE
The power of a spouse through control over the petition was continued
in the 1952 Inmigration and Nationality Act, the basis for current
immigration law. However, the rhetoric was changed from giving the
power over immigration status to "husbands" to affording it to "spouses. 93
The 1965 immigration law continued the spousal power to petition, while
establishing the basic framework for family based immigration that exists
today.94 Under that framework, spouses of citizens or legal permanent
residents were among the categories of aliens allowed to become legal
permanent residents. However, the process to become a legal resident on
this basis generally must be initiated by a petition filed by the citizen or
resident spouse.95
In 1986 the power of the citizen or resident spouse was increased.
Under amendments passed in that year, certain aliens married to citizens or
residents were given permanent resident status on a conditional basis; their
resident status could expire in two years even after their spouses had
petitioned for them and they had met all qualifications for legal permanent
resident status. 96 To prevent the expiration of the spouse's permanent
resident status after two years, both spouses had to file a joint petition.97
91. Calvo, supra note 1, at 601-03.
92. Id. at 596, 601.
93. Id. at 604.
94. Id. at 605-06.
95. Id. at 606.
96. Id. at 607.
97. See 68 Interpreter Releases 334-35 (Mar. 25, 1991): Wheeler, Until INS Do
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B. 1990: SOME ASSISTANCE FOR CONDITIONAL RESIDENTS
Congress first directly addressed the issue of spousal power and
control in 1990 in the context of conditional resident status. The 1990
amendments to the immigration law modified the grounds on which a
conditional resident alien spouse could obtain a waiver to the requirement
that both spouses file a joint petition to prevent the termination of the
conditional resident's legal status. The amendments allowed the alien
spouse to self-petition without her citizen or resident spouse's cooperation
in three situations: if she had entered into her marriage in good faith, but
she or her child was subject to battering or extreme cruelty; if she had
entered into her marriage in good faith, but the marriage terminated; or if
she would suffer extreme hardship if deported.98
The House Judiciary Committee Report stated that the purpose of
these changes was to "ensure" that neither a spouse nor a child would be
"entrapped in the abusive relationship by the threat of losing their legal
resident status." 99 Thus, the focus was not on rejecting spousal control. It
was not sufficient that a spouse had entered the marriage in good faith; she
had to be divorced or abused or subject to extreme hardship before she
would be allowed to self-petition.
These amendments thus failed to address the whole problem of
spousal control for conditional residents. However, they further failed to
address, at all, the problem of spousal control of the initial petitioning
process and the related consequence of citizens or residents using
immigration law to entrap their spouses in abuse. The immigration law
continued to give the citizen or resident spouse total control over his alien
spouse's ability to initially gain legal immigrant status. The citizen or
resident relative was the only person who had the legal right to file the
petition that was the first necessary step for legal resident status. By
having control over immigration status, the citizen or resident had control
over whether his spouse could live and work in this country. Further,
abusers used the control over immigration status to stop their spouses from
reporting or fleeing from the abuse. Abusers did so by threatening
deportation and loss of ability to work and loss of child custody because of
U.S. Part: A Guide to IMFA, 90-3 Immigration Briefings (Mar. 1990); Joe A. Tucker,
Assimilation to the United States: A Study of the Adjustment of Status and the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Statute, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 20, 37-38 (1989).
98. 8 U.S.C. § i186a(c)(4)(B) (2000). For a full discussion of conditional
residence status and waivers, see 4 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 42.02-06 (perm ed., rev. vol. 2003).
99. H.R. REP. No. 101-723, pt. 1, at 51,78 (1990).
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deportation.100 Abusive citizens used the immigration laws to perpetuate
abuse against their alien relatives and to prevent them from seeking
assistance, protective orders, or the arrest and prosecution of their
abusers.' 0 1
C. POST-1990 PROPOSALS: A SHIFT FROM REMOVING POWER AND
CONTROL TO AMELIORATING ABUSE
In the early 1990s congressional representatives turned their attention
to the power of the petition, which is the total legal control of a citizen or
resident of his spouse's immigration status through the ability to refuse to
file a petition. 10 Initial legislative proposals to address the spousal control
of the initial petitioning process focused simply on removing the power to
petition from the citizen or resident spouse and allowing the immigrant
spouse to file a petition herself. The proposals then moved to additionally
addressing situations of abuse. Ultimately, in the legislation passed,
removal of the coverture-like power to petition was rejected. The
legislation focused only on providing relief to the abused. To obtain
immigration status, spouses could not operate from a position of self-
initiative and control; they had to show that they were abused to the extent
of being "victims." Further, as Linda Kelly has pointed out, they further
had to demonstrate that they were "good victims' 0 3 with criteria and
evidentiary requirements that other spouses did not have to meet.
100. Calvo, supra note 1. Further, the immigration service undermined the
effectiveness of the waiver for abused conditional residents by requiring that extreme
cruelty could be demonstrated only through affidavits from a limited group of mental health
professionals. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5 (e)(3)(iv)-(vii) (2000). For a discussion see Martha Davis
& Janet M. Calvo, INS Interim Rule Diminishes Protection for Abused Spouses and
Children, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 665, 665-70 (June 3, 1991). This requirement was
extremely burdensome because few programs for abused women have certified mental
health professionals on their staffs. The regulation appeared to be contrary to the House
Report that contemplated acceptance of all types of credible evidence, e.g., reports from
police and social service agencies. H.R. REP. No. 101-723, pt. I at 78-79 (1990).
101. See, e.g., Hearing on Legal Immigration Reform Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees and Int'l Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st. Cong.,
665-68 (1989) (testimony of the Honorable Louise Slaughter, member of Congress); C.
HOGELAND & R. ROSEN, DREAMS LOST, DREAMS FOUND; UNDOCUMENTED WOMEN IN THE
LAND OF OPPORTUNITY (1990); Calvo, supra note 1, at 593-95; Michelle J. Anderson, A
License to Abuse: The Impact of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L.J.
1401, 1401-05 (1993).
102. See supra note 12.
103. Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards' Fathers and Good Victims:
Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51
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1. Initial Proposals: Remove the Power and Control Over the Petition
a. H.R. 5693 and 782
The first legislative attempt, which focused on the petitioning process,
directly removed the coverture-like spouse power from the law. In July of
1992, Congressman Mazzoli and Congresswoman Slaughter introduced
H.R. 5693.1°4 It proposed to amend the immigration law to allow aliens
who were the spouses of citizens or permanent residents to file a petition on
their own. This proposal addressed the spousal control and power problem
by removing the power to petition from all citizen and resident spouses.
This was a simple solution with comprehensive consequences. It
recognized that the control of one spouse over the other was inappropriate.
It also did not require the escalation of power domination in the marital
relationship to reach to level of physical harm or other abuse. 10 5 This bill
was referred to Committee but was never reported out.
The next year on February 3, 1993, H.R. 782, a modified and more
limited version of the 1992 bill was introduced. 1°6 This bill allowed the
alien spouse of a United States citizen or a legal permanent resident to file
a petition only in two circumstances. In the first situation, the alien spouse
had to have been abused or subjected to extreme cruelty by the citizen or
resident spouse during the marriage. Additionally, the abused alien spouse
had to have lived in the United States and at sometime resided in the
United States with the citizen or resident spouse and entered the marriage
in good faith. In the second situation, the alien spouse had to have been
married for at least three years and had to reside in the United States with a
citizen or resident who had failed to file a relative petition.'17 This bill did
not treat all aliens spouses equally, but it also did not require harm to the
alien spouse before a self-petition could be filed. It required either abuse or
a lengthy relationship. This implicitly recognized that the refusal to file a
petition over a length of time was inappropriate power based behavior. 108
HASTINGS L.J. 557, 580 (2000).
104. H.R. 5693, 102d Cong. § 1(a) (1992).
105. The bill also countered INS regulation by requiring that the Attorney General
had to consider any credible evidence submitted in support of an application for a waiver of
the joint petition requirement to remove conditional resident status "whether or not the
evidence is supported by an evaluation of a licensed mental health professional." H.R.
5693, 102d Cong. § 2(a).
106. H.R. 782, 103d Cong. (1993). H.R. 782 was sponsored by Congressman
Mazzoli.
107. H.R. 782, 103d Cong. § I(a).
108. This bill also addressed the INS regulation that limited the kind of evidence that
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b. Safe Homes for Immigrant Women and Protection for Immigrant
Women
In 1993, a proposed version of the Violence Against Women Act first
contained provisions specifically addressing domestic violence against
aliens. A version of the Violence Against Women Act had first been
introduced in the Senate in 199 0 ' 9 and in the House in 1991."0 On
February 24, 1993, a version of the Violence Against Women Act, H.R.
1133 was introduced in the House of Representatives' that included the
subtitle, Safe Homes for Immigrant Women."
2
Like the 1992 bill, Safe Homes for Immigrant Women allowed self-
petitioning to the alien spouse or child of a citizen or resident." 3  By
providing for self-petitioning, the bill removed the power and control over
immigration status. Safe Homes for Immigrant Women additionally
addressed the problem of the immigration law as a tool for familial abuse
by recognizing abused children, and the parents of children who are
abused, as well as abused spouses.
Safe Homes for Immigrant Women provided further protections for
those who met the definition of abused family member. "Abused" was
defined as battering and subjugation to extreme cruelty. In the case of a
child, abuse also included abandonment. The definition of an "abused alien
family member" included the spouse or child of a citizen or legal
permanent resident who had been abused by that citizen or resident, and the
spouse of a citizen or resident whose child had been abused by the citizen
could be submitted in support of conditional residents' request for a battered spouse waiver.
The bill proposed that any credible evidence submitted must be considered. However, it
further stated that the determination of what evidence was credible and the weight to be
given the evidence was within the sole discretion of the Attorney General. H.R. 782, 103d
Cong. § 2(a).
109. S. 2754, 101st Cong. (1990).
110. H.R. 1502, 102d Cong. (1991).
111. Violence Against Women Act of 1993, H.R. 1133, 103d Cong. (1993). This
bill was sponsored by Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder and had 61 original co-sponsors
including Congresswoman Louise Slaughter who was a major proponent of the battered
spouse waiver, Safe Homes for Immigrant Women and one of the original co-sponsors of
the Violence Against Women Act. Chairman Mazzoli and Representative Charles Schumer
of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration and Refugees and
Representative Barney Frank of the House Judiciary Committee were also original co-
sponsors of the Violence Against Women Act.
112. H.R. 1133, 103d Cong. § 231 (Subtitle C of Title II is entitled Safe Homes for
Immigrant Women). The Senate version of the Violence Against Women Act, S. 11, 103d
Cong. (1993), introduced on January 21,1993, did not contain a similar subtitle.
113. H.R. 1133, 103d Cong. § 231(b) (1993).
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or resident parent.1 4 The bill thus applied to abused alien spouses, abused
alien children and alien spouses trying to protect their citizen or alien
children from abuse.
Safe Homes for Immigrant Women provided for protection against
deportation and work authorization for abused spouses and children who
were in the United States, while also guarding against fraudulent claims.'5
An abused spouse or child was protected from deportation on certain non-
serious grounds and could be granted work authorization until an
immigrant visa was available and an adjustment of status application was
adjudicated."16 The bill also made it easier for an abused spouse or child to
apply for adjustment of status by deeming her to have been inspected and
admitted and allowing her to apply for adjustment if she was in unlawful
status or if she had worked when not authorized. 17 As a deterrent to fraud,
the proposal provided for the revocation of work authorization and the
initiation of deportation proceedings against anyone who made a fraudulent
claim of abuse."
18
Additionally, the bill allowed a divorced abused spouse to continue to
be eligible for immigrant status if a relative petition was filed within two
years of the divorce and she had not remarried." 9 It addressed two
situations confronting abused women. In some instances, the abuser
initiated a divorce. In other situations, the abused spouse found that
breaking the ties with the abuser through divorce was needed to best
protect her. If an abused spouse could not file the petition because of
divorce, the abuser would still have the power of control over immigration
status; therefore he could use that power to prevent the abused spouse from
seeking protective orders, arrest and prosecution. The bill allowed abused
women to obtain a divorce as a means of avoiding further abuse.
Also under the bill, an abused alien family member would have been
able to raise the abuse issue in any proceeding to exclude or deport her.
Along with any other review processes, an abused alien family member
114. H.R. 1133, 103d Cong. § 231(a) (1993).
115. H.R. 1133 § 231(d).
116. H.R. 1133 § 231(d).
117. Violence Against Women Act of 1993, H.R. 1133 § 231 (e).
118. Safe Homes for Immigrant Women also made it easier for an abused spouse or
child to apply for adjustment of status. Under the proposal an abused alien family member
could apply for adjustment if she was in unlawful status or if she worked when not
authorized. She could also be deemed to have been inspected and admitted. H.R. 1133,
103d Cong. § 231 (e) (1993).
119. H.R. 1133 § 231 (c). This provision was similar to the law that allowed widows
of U.S. citizens to continue to be eligible for immigrant status if they apply within two years
of their spouse's death. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
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could have had the denial or revocation of a relative petition, an application
for adjustment of status, a stay of deportation or work authorization
reviewed in a deportation or exclusion proceeding. 120
Safe Homes for Immigrant Women also addressed some of the
problems with the implementation of the 1990 "battered spouse waiver"
amendments for conditional residents. This bill made it clear that INS had
to accept and consider all evidence submitted to support a battered spouse
waiver. 21 Under the bill's provisions, the conditional resident would have
an opportunity at a hearing to confront any adverse evidence and present
evidence to support her claim of abuse before a determination to deny her
waiver application could be made.
1 22
Safe Homes for Immigrant Women thus proposed to remove the
power to petition and also to address the special problems confronting
abused alien women and children. 23 Safe Homes for Immigrant Women
did not survive the committee process. However, many of the proposals
relating to the abused contained in this bill were the basis for legislation
subsequently passed, particularly the 2000 amendments to the Violence
Against Women Act.
In November 1993, the House Judiciary Committee reported out H.R.
1133, the Violence Against Women Act. 124  This version of the bill
120. H.R. 1133 § 231 (g)(2).
121. See Violence Against Women Act of 1993, H.R. 1133, 103d Cong. § 231(g)(1)
(1993). The INS had denied a petition filed by an abused conditional resident without
giving that resident the opportunity to confront adverse evidence the INS had received. The
resident's status was terminated and she automatically became an undocumented alien. In
this way, the INS had allowed an abuser to achieve the termination of his spouse's legal
status by making untested allegations against his spouse.
122. H.R. 1133 § 231 (g)(2).
123. See H.R. 1133. It removed control over immigration status as a tool for abuse
and made it possible for state law remedies against the abused to be used effectively. It
attempted to address the plight of abused alien spouses and children who were left in an
undocumented status by their abusive spouses or parents. Undocumented alien spouses
were significantly impeded from leaving their abusers because they did not have the
employment authorization necessary to support themselves and their children. Further,
many abused women and children could not return to their home countries even to process a
visa application because they would be in danger from their spouses or their spouse's
families, especially when the law of their home countries would not protect them.
Moreover, any protection orders that abused family members were able to obtain under the
laws of the various states in the United States would have no affect outside the United
States.
124. H.R. 1133 (version 4). The Senate version of the Violence Against Women Act
reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee did not contain a similar section. Violence
Against Women Act of 1993, S. 1I, 103d Cong. (1993).
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contained the subtitle, Protection for Immigrant Women. 25 The February
24, 1993 version of this bill was amended in the Subcommittee on Crime
and Criminal Justice on November 16 and again in the Committee on the
Judiciary on November 17.126 The amendments changed several provisions
of the February bill, including those dealing with abused immigrants.
27
Protection for Immigrant Women addressed the problem of power and
control over immigration status and also the additional problem of abused
aliens. However, it did so less comprehensively than the originally
proposed Safe Homes for Immigrant Women.
Protection for Immigrant Women first modified the relative petition
process. It allowed two categories of alien spouses to self-petition 28 and
further provided that these petitions would not be revoked based on the
legal termination of the marriage upon which they were based. 129 One
category of alien spouses allowed to self-petition focused on the power to
petition. It included an alien spouse who could demonstrate that she had
been married to and resided with a citizen or resident spouse in the United
States for at least three years, that she was currently residing in the United
States with the alien spouse and that the citizen or resident spouse had
failed to file a petition on her behalf. 30 A second category focused on the
abused and included an alien spouse who could demonstrate that she or her
child had been battered by or had been the subject of extreme cruelty
perpetrated by her citizen or resident spouse during the marriage, that she
had entered into the marriage in good faith, that she at one time resided in
the United States with the citizen or resident spouse, and that she currently
resided in the United States.
Protection for Immigrant Women also dealt with abuse by adding a
new category of aliens eligible for suspension of deportation. 131 Under this
bill, an alien who was in the United States and had been battered or
subjected to extreme cruelty in the United States by a United States citizen
125. H.R. 133 (Subtitle D).
126. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 28-29 (1993).
127. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 28-29.
128. H.R. 1133 § 241(a) (version 4).
129. H.R. 1133 § 241 (c) (version 4).
130. H.R. 1133 § 241(a)(version 4). Other aliens in familial relationships with
United States citizens who do not petition for them have been allowed to petition for
themselves. The surviving alien spouses of United States citizens are allowed to self-
petition. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000). Also, certain children of United States
citizens were allowed to self-petition when the citizen parent did not. These include certain
children born in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea or Thailand. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(f) (2000).
These laws recognize the hardship imposed on children and spouses by uncaring United
States relatives.
131. H.R. 1133 § 243 (version 4).
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or permanent resident spouse or parent could be granted suspension if, in
the opinion of the Attorney General, her deportation would result in
extreme hardship to the alien or the alien's parent or child. The abused
alien also had to prove that while in the United States she had been a
person of good moral character and was not deportable on the grounds of
marriage fraud, criminal offenses, failure to register, or falsification of
documents or security and related grounds.' 
32
Protection for Immigrant Women also confronted the problem caused
by the INS implementation of the 1990 amendments for abused spouses.
Protection for Immigrant Women directed the Attorney General to consider
any credible evidence submitted in support of hardship waivers based on
battering or extreme cruelty regardless of whether or not the evidence was
supported by an evaluation of a licensed mental health professional.
However, the Attorney General was given discretion to determine what
evidence was credible and what weight should be given to that evidence. 1
33
While Protection for Immigrant Women was not as comprehensive as
the originally proposed Safe Homes for Immigrant Women, it contained
some provisions to ameliorate the power and control of a citizen or resident
spouse, and it specifically addressed the problem of abused spouses and
children. The amendments in Protection for Immigrant Women were
included in the Violence Against Women Act passed by the House of
Representatives in 1993.134 The version of the Violence Against Women
Act passed by the Senate in 1993 did not contain any amendments to the
immigration law. 1
35
2. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: Continuation of the Power
to Petition with Some Exceptions for the Abused
The Violence Against Women Act was considered in a House/Senate
conference committee as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994.136 The conference committee made changes in
the immigration law provisions of the House bill by rejecting removal of
the power to petition and limiting the provisions that addressed abuse. The
conference committee changes were accepted by the House 137 and Senate 38
132. H.R. 1133 § 243 (version 4).
133. H.R. 1133 § 242.
134. H.R. 3355, 103d Cong. (1993); 139 CONG. REC. 27, 241 (1993).
135. S. 1607, 103rd Cong. (1993).
136. H.R. 3355; H. REP. No. 103-711 (1994).
137. 140 CONG. REC. H9,155 (1994).
138. 140 CONG. REC. S 13,047 (1994).
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in August of 1994 and became law when the President signed 139 the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 in September. 1
40
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994141 amended several
provisions of the immigration law: those that applied to petitions to classify
aliens as relatives eligible to apply for permanent resident status, those that
suspended deportation and the evidence necessary to make these
applications, and those that addressed battered spouse waiver of the joint
petition required to continue the permanent status of conditional
residents.142 These changes focused on ameliorating abuse, but not on
doing away with the power and control that underlies abuse.
Under these amendments, three groups of the abused could file
relative petitions for classification of themselves, and in certain cases their
children, as immediate relatives or preference immigrants, thus beginning
the process to become a permanent resident. The first group included alien
spouses of United States citizens or legal permanent residents who were
either battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by their spouses. The second
group included alien spouses whose citizen or alien children were battered
or subjected to extreme cruelty by the aliens' United States citizen or legal
permanent resident spouses. The third group consisted of alien children
who had been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by their United
States citizen or legal permanent resident parents. 143  However, being
abused was the basic criteria. No provision was made for spouses even in
long-term good faith marriages. The changes in this law, made in the
conference committee, had rejected self-petitioning for those who could not
demonstrate abuse. For the abused, the most major change in the self-
petitioning scheme was the addition of the requirement that the abused
person had to show extreme hardship before the petition would be
accepted. Children also had to demonstrate that their deportation would
result in extreme hardship to themselves. Spouses had to demonstrate that
their deportation would result in extreme hardship to themselves or their
children.' 44 The extreme hardship requirement was a large hurdle to
overcome.
145
139. 140 CONG. REC. H9,155 (1994).
140. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796.
141. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902.
142. Violence Against Women Act of 1994 §§ 40701-40702.
143. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 154(a)(l)(A), 154(a)(1)(B) (1994).
144. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II), 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1994).
145. Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered Immigrants in
the Violence Against Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 665, 684-86 (1998).
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In addition to abuse and extreme hardship, these alien spouses and
children had to show the following: they were persons of good moral
character, they were otherwise eligible for immediate relative or preference
classification, they were residing in the United States and at some time they
resided with the abusive United States citizen or legal permanent resident
spouse or parent in the United States.146 A spouse had to show that the
abuse of the spouse or spouse's child happened sometime during the
marriage. A child had to show that the abuse happened sometime while the
child and parent resided together. 47  A spouse additionally had to
demonstrate that she entered into the marriage in good faith. 148
The suspension of deportation law was also amended to add a new
category of abused aliens eligible to suspend deportation and change their
status to legal permanent residents. The amendments covered three basic
groups of the abused. The first included aliens who were battered or
subjected to extreme cruelty by United States citizen or legal permanent
resident spouses. The second group consisted of aliens who were battered
or subjected to extreme cruelty by United States citizen or legal permanent
resident parents. The third group consisted of aliens who were the parents
of children who were battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by the United
States citizen or legal permanent resident parents. 1
49
In addition to demonstrating that she fit into a recognized group of
abused, the alien seeking suspension had to meet the following criteria.
She had to show the abuse took place in the United States, she had been
physically present in the United States for a continuous period of at least
three years immediately preceding her application for suspension, she was
a person of good moral character and had been for the three year period
preceding her application, and she was a deportable alien, but not
deportable on certain grounds (marriage fraud, criminal offenses,
falsification of documents or security and related grounds).150  Most
significantly she had to prove that she was a person whose deportation
would result in extreme hardship to herself or her parent, or child. 1
51
Thus, while the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 contained
some assistance for abused spouses who could meet the statute's various
criteria and evidentiary standards, these criteria and standards left out a
146. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(l)(A)(iii)(II), 1154(a)(l)(B) (1994).
147. §§ 1154(a)(i)(A)(iii)(II), 1154(a)(1)(B).
148. §§ 1154(a)(l)(A)(iii)(II), 1154(a)(1)(B).
149. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(3) (1994) (repealed 1996).
150. § 1254(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 12551 (1994) (transferred to 8 U.S.C. § 1227 in 1996).
151. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(3).
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number of abused spouses.152  Significantly, the law as passed did not
contain any provision for non-citizen spouses whose citizen resident
spouses maintained power and control by refusing to petition, but whose
behavior could not be proven to meet the heightened criteria of battering or
extreme cruelty.
3. Attempts to Prevent General Changes in Immigration Law from
Undermining Protections for the Abused: 1996
In 1996, just two years after the Violence Against Women Act of
1994 (VAWA 1994), major changes were made in immigration laws and
laws related to public assistance eligibility for non citizens that threatened
the changes that had been made in 1994 to protect abused immigrant
spouses and children. 153  This occurred despite extensive congressional
condemnation of domestic violence. 54 The response by advocates for the
abused was to lobby to carve out exceptions for the abused from the harsh
affects of the new legislation. However, several impediments for abused
immigrant spouses remained.1
55
152. For comments on the problems unresolved by that statute see Deborah
Weissman, Protecting the Battered Immigrant Women, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1994, at 81; Jenny
Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the Construction of Multiple Consciousness in
the Civil Rights Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 463 (1996); Linda Kelly, Domestic
Violence Survivors: Surviving the Beatings of 1996, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L. 303 (1997); Ryan
Lilienthal, Note, Old Hurdles Hamper New Options for Battered Immigrant Women, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1595 (1996); Tien-Li Loke, Note, Trapped in Domestic Violence: The
Impact of United States Immigration Laws on Battered Immigrant Women, 6 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 589 (1997); Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered
Immigrants in the Violence Against Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 665 (1998); Lee J.
Teran, Barriers to Protection at Home and Abroad: Mexican Victims of Domestic Violence
and the Violence Against Women Act, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1999); Maurice Goldman, The
Violence Against Women Act: Meeting Its Goals in Protecting Battered Immigrant Women?
37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTs REV. 375 (1999); Elizabeth Shor, Domestic Abuse and Alien
Women in Immigration Law: Response and Responsibility, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB POL'Y
697 (2000); Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards' Fathers and Good Victims:
Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 557 (2000); Nimish Ganatra, The Cultural Dynamic in Domestic Violence:
Understanding the Additional Burdens Battered Immigrant Women of Color Face in the
United States, 2 J.L. Soc'Y 109 (2001); Michelle DeCasas, Protecting Hispanic Women:
The Inadequacy of Domestic Violence Policy, 24 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 56 (2003).
153. Additionally, in 1996 a new controversial provision making abusers deportable
was enacted. See discussion infra Section V.C.4.
154. See supra Section IV.
155. See Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving the Beatings of 1996,
11 GEO. IMMIGR. [U. 303 (1997); Lilienthal, supra note 152; Loke, supra note 152; Linda
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The 1996 Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRAIRA)156 made changes to immigration law that expedited the removal
of deportable aliens and limited their ability to obtain discretionary relief
from deportation. Under this law applicants for admission to the United
States have a three-year or ten year bar to entry if they have previously
resided unlawfully in the United States depending on the time of unlawful
presence.157  However, these provisions are waived for certain abused
spouses and children who were beneficiaries of provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act. 58  The abused must demonstrate a "substantial
connection" between the unlawful entry or overstay and the domestic
violence unless they entered the United States prior to April 1, 1997,
IIRAIRAs effective date.
59
Further, under this statute deportation and exclusion proceedings
became removal proceedings and suspension of deportation was replaced
by "cancellation of removal."' 6  However, for battered women and
children the criteria for cancellation stayed the same as that for suspension:
three years physical presence, extreme hardship, and good moral
character. 161 Moreover, IRAIRA contained some additional provisions that
assist the abused. The statute prohibited INS officers from making adverse
determinations based solely on information gained from the abuser and
prohibited the unauthorized release of information about battered women
and children. 1
62
Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered Immigrants in the Violence
Against Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 665 (1998); Cecelia M. Espenoza, No Relieffor the
Wear)': VA WA Relief Denied for Battered Immigrants Lost in the Intersections, 83 MARQ. L.
REV. 163 (1999); Teran, supra note 152; Goldman, supra note 152; Julie Linares-Fierro, A
Mother Removed - A Child Left Behind: A Battered Immigrant's Need for a Modified Best
Interest Standard, 1 SCHOLAR 253 (1999); Shor, supra note 152; Linda Kelly, Republican
Mothers, Bastards' Fathers and Good Victims: Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection
Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 557 (2000); Ganatra, supra note
152; Hannah R. Shapiro, Battered Immigrant Women Caught in the Intersection of U.S.
Criminal and Immigration Laws: Consequences and Remedies, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 27 (2002); Decasas, supra note 152.
156. Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009 (1997) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2000)) (also known as IIRAIRA).
157. 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (2000) (IIRAIRA § 301(b)(1); INA §
212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I)).
158. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii), (a)(6)(A)(ii) (2000).
159. 8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(6)(A)(ii)(III) (2000).
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)-(b) (2000).
161. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2000) (INA § 240A(b)(2)).
162. 8 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (IIRAIRA § 384).
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Additionally, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) was passed in 1996.163 It eliminated access
to federally and state-funded public benefits for many immigrant non-
citizens. 164 IIRAIRA however, addressed the issue of benefit access for
some battered immigrants. These included VAWA self-petitioners and
VAWA cancellation and suspension applicants, battered immigrants who
were the beneficiaries of family-based visa applications filed by abusive
United States citizens or lawful permanent resident spouses or parents and
battered immigrant conditional or lawful permanent residents who had
previously been barred from access to public benefits because of sponsor
deeming.165 However, battered spouses must demonstrate a substantial
connection between the abuse and the need for the benefit. 66 Further,
battered immigrants who entered the United States after August 22, 1996
are barred for five years from federal means tested benefits such as TANF,
non-emergency Medicaid Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and food
stamps. 167
4. Domestic Violence Becomes a Deportable Offense
In 1996, legislation also made certain offenses connected with
domestic abuse grounds for deportation. The statute makes deportable any
alien who "is convicted of a crime of domestic violence, a crime of
stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment. ' ' 68
Moreover, the statute goes further and makes violation of a civil or criminal
order of protection a deportable offense.1
69
163. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
164. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1611-13, 1621-22 (2000).
165. IIRAIRA § 501 sets forth categories of aliens eligible for public benefits.
IIRAIRA § 552 provides exceptions regarding previously obtained monetary support for
abused aliens. For a detailed explanation of the provisions see Leslye E. Orloff & Janice V.
Kaguyutan, Offering a Helping Hand: Legal Protections for Battered Immigrant Women: A
History of Legislative Responses, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 95 (2001); Leslye
Orloff, Lifesaving Welfare Safety Net Access for Battered Immigrant Women and Children:
Accomplishments and Next Steps, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 597 (2001).
166. 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c) (2000) (IIRAIRA § 501). For an explanation of situations
that have been determined to demonstrate "substantial connection" between battery and the
need for public benefits, see Guidance on Standards and Methods for Determining Whether
a Substantial Connection Exists Between Battery or Extreme Cruelty and Need for Specific
Benefits, 62 Fed. Reg. 65,285, 65,285-87 (Dep't of Justice Dec. Ii, 1997). For more details
on battered immigrants welfare eligibility see Orloff, supra note 165, at 620.
167. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611(c), 1613, 631(d) (2000).
168. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2000).
169. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (2000).
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While on the surface this may seem to assist the abused, it has caused
great difficulty for many. The first problem for the spouses of legal
permanent residents was that if the resident spouse was deported and lost
status, the abused spouse had no basis to self-petition. The Violence
Against Women Act addressed this in 2000 by providing that a spouse
could self-petition within two years of the abusive spouse's loss of
status.170 However, serious remaining difficulties result from the failure to
address how these provisions operate within the complexities of state civil
and criminal justice systems. 17  Unfortunately, as explained below, the
women who are abused may become deportable through these provisions.
Further, the looming deportation of an abuser dissuades, rather than
encourages, many abused women from seeking orders of protection or the
arrest and prosecution of their abusers. 1
72
5. Mail-Order Brides: An Ineffective and Unimplemented Response
In the 1990s the already growing mail order bride business burgeoned.
These businesses promote the arrangements of marriages between United
States citizen or resident men and women from predominately developing
or financially strapped countries, most often, the Philippines and Russia.
173
The use of the Internet in the 1990s increased these businesses. In the
1980s, the women predominantly came from the Pacific Rim countries.
The 1992 breakdown of the former Soviet Union led to an increase in mail-
order brides from that area.
174
A number of incidents, particularly murder of mail-order brides by
their American husbands, drew public attention to domestic violence by
U.S. spouses against their mail-order brides. 75  In 1996, Congress
170. See infra note 199.
171. See infra notes 299-306. See also Espenoza, supra note 155, at 182-91(1999);
Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving The Beatings of 1996, 11 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 303, 316-21(1997).
172. See infra notes 299-306.
173. Donna R. Lee, Mail Fantasy: Global Sexual Exploitation in the Mail-order
Bride Industry and Proposed Legal Solutions, 5 ASIAN L.J. 139 (1998); Tifany E. Markee,
Comment, A Call for Cultural Understanding in the Creation, Interpretation and
Application of Law: Is the United States Meeting the Needs of Russian Immigrant "Mail-
Order Brides?", 31 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 277 (2001).
174. Markee, supra note 173.
175. Susana Blackwell, a Filipina mail-order bride,
made news headlines in 1995 when her husband, afraid that she was
filing for a divorce, shot and killed her in a Seattle courthouse. The
controversy surrounding the Susana Blackwell murder triggered
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specifically addressed the issue through legislation in section 652 of the
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.176 Previously the mail-order
marriage industry had been mentioned in the legislative history of the
Marriage Fraud Act. There the focus had been on the fraud possibilities of
these arrangements, i.e., the notion of foreign women entering into a
marriage with a U.S male only for immigration purposes.177 The 1996 law
added concerns about spouse abuse to concerns about fraud. 78 Missing
scrutiny of the immigration policies in place at the time and ultimately
led to Congressional amendments as well as to the implementation of
laws that purported to afford additional protections to mail-order brides.
Beverly Encarguez Perez, Woman Warrior Meets Mail-order Bride: Finding An Asian
American Voice in the Women'"s Movement, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 211, 226 (2003).
[I]n 1996 Jack Reeves, a retired U.S. Army sergeant, was convicted of
murdering his fourth wife, Emelita Reeves, a mail-order bride from the
Philippines. Only months earlier, he was convicted of killing his second
wife; his third wife, a mail-order bride from Korea, drowned under
mysterious circumstances in 1986. All of the women died after
informing Reeves that they wanted a divorce.
Donna R. Lee, Mail Fantasy: Global Sexual Exploitation in the Mail-Order Bride Industry
and Proposed Legal Solutions 5 ASIAN L.J. 139, 153 (1998).
[Alnother mail-order bride made headlines when her decomposed body
was found in a shallow grave in Marysville, Washington. Anastasia
Solovieva King, a twenty-year old Russian mail-order bride, came to the
United States by marrying an American nineteen years her senior. Her
husband was arrested ... for allegedly strangling her to death.
Beverly Encarguez Perez, Woman Warrior Meets Mail-order Bride: Finding an Asian
American Voice in the Women's Movement, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 211, 237 (2003).
176. Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 652, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1375 (2000)).
177. Immigration Marriage Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 9 (1985); Lisa C.
Ikemoto, Male Fraud, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 511 (2001); INS Reveals Basis for Fraud
Claims, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 26-27 (1988).
178. 8 U.S.C. § 1375(a) (2000). The Congress finds as follows:
(1) There is a substantial "mail-order bride" business in the United
States. With approximately 200 companies in the United States, an
estimated 2,000 to 3,500 men in the United States find wives through
mail-order bride catalogs each year. However, there are no official
statistics available on the number of mail-order brides entering the
United States each year.
(2) The companies engaged in the mail-order bride business earn
substantial profits.
(3) Although many of these mail-order marriages work out, in many
other cases, anecdotal evidence suggests that mail-order brides find
themselves in abusive relationships. There is also evidence to suggest
that a substantial number of mail-order marriages are fraudulent under
United States law.
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from congressional concern, however, was the coverture notion of spousal
domination and control.
The 1996 statute states that Congress has determined that there is a
large and unregulated "mail order bride" industry in the United States in
which the participants earn substantial profits. 179 Further, there is evidence
to suggest that these "international matchmaking organizations" facilitate
abusive and fraudulent marriages. Congress further noted that many "mail
order brides come to the United States unaware or ignorant of United States
immigration law."' 80  Specifically, Congress has determined that many
"mail order brides" who find themselves in abusive relationships think that
if they flee an abusive marriage, they will be deported from the United
States. This belief is often the result of threats by the abusive spouse to
have the victim deported if the abuse is reported to law enforcement
authorities. 181
In response to these findings, Congress mandated two things:
dissemination of information by the businesses to the women they recruit
and a report detailing the results of a study on mail-order marriages.1
82
Under the statute every international matchmaking organization doing
business in the United States must disseminate information to those
recruited. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (now BCIS) was
authorized to decide in detail what information is appropriate. However,
the statute does mandate that the information be disseminated in the
recruit's native language, and include information regarding conditional
permanent residence status, the battered spouse waiver, permanent resident
status, marriage fraud penalties, the unregulated nature of the business
engaged in by such organizations, and the results of the required study.
8 3
(4) Many mail-order brides come to the United States unaware or
ignorant of United States immigration law. Mail-order brides who are
battered often think that if they flee an abusive marriage, they will be
deported. Often the citizen spouse threatens to have them deported if
they report the abuse.
(5) The Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates that the rate
of marriage fraud between foreign nationals and United States citizens
or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence is 8 percent. It is
unclear what percentage of these marriage fraud cases originated as
mail-order marriages.
§ 1375(a).
179. 8 U.S.C. § 1375(A)(2) (IIRIRA § 652(a)(2)).
180. 8 U.S.C. § 1375(A)(4) (IIRIRA § 652(a)(4)).
181. Id.
182. 8 U.S.C. § 1375(b), (c) (2000).
183. 8 U.S.C. § 1375(b)(1) (2000).
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The statutory penalty for failure to comply is a civil fine of not more than
twenty thousand dollars for each offense.'
84
The report mandated by the statute was supposed to address the
number of mail-order marriages, the extent of fraud and domestic abuse in
such marriage, the utilization of suspension of deportation or self-
petitioning on the basis of being abused, and the need for further regulation
and education.185 The report was not issued by the INS until 1999,186 and
as explained below did not meet the congressional mandate.'87 The INS
failed to promulgate final implementing regulations for this statute and the
issue is now on the regulatory agenda of the INS successor, the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS).
6. The Violence Against Women Act of 2000: Changes to Protect the
Abused but Continuation of the Power to Petition
The 1994 VAWA law assisted a number of battered spouses, but both
the limitations of that law and subsequent changes to the immigration and
welfare laws undermined the capacity of abused immigrants to escape
abuse. 88 Advocates for domestic violence survivors persisted 89 and in
184. 8 U.S.C. § 1375(b)(2)(A) (2000).
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1375(c) (2000).
The Attorney General, in consultation with the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization and the Director of the Violence
Against Women Initiative of the Department of Justice, shall conduct a
study of mail-order marriages to determine, among other things-
(I) the number of such marriages;
(2) the extent of marriage fraud in such marriages, including an estimate
of the extent of marriage fraud arising from the services provided by
international matchmaking organizations;
(3) the extent to which mail-order spouses utilize section 1254a(a)(3) of
this title (providing for suspension of deportation in certain cases
involving abuse), or section 1 154(a)(1)(A)(iii) of this title (providing for
certain aliens who have been abused to file a classification petition on
their own behalf);
(4) the extent of domestic abuse in mail-order marriages; and
(5) the need for continued or expanded regulation and education to
implement the objectives of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
and the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 with respect
to mail-order marriages.
Id.
186. INS Reports to Congress on Mail-Order Brides, 76 No. 12 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 495 (1999).
187. See infra note 254.
188. Felicia E. Franco, Unconditional Safety for Conditional Immigrant Women, I I
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2000, the Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000 was signed
into law as part of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act
of 2000, VAWA 2000.190 This law removed many of the obstacles to self-
petitioning for the abused and expanded the categories of those who could
be eligible. It also established a nonimmigrant U visa for non-citizens who
suffer criminal activity related abuse, including victims of domestic
violence who are not eligible for VAWA cancellation or self-petitioning.19'
Congressional intent behind the 2000 provisions was expressed as
follows: 192
The Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000..
. continues the work of the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994 (VAWA) in removing obstacles ... that may
hinder or prevent battered immigrants from fleeing
domestic violence safely and prosecuting their abusers by
allowing an abusive citizen or lawful permanent resident
spouse to blackmail the abused spouse through threats
related to the abused spouse's immigration status.
193
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 99 (1996); Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving
the Beatings of 1996, 1I GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 303 (1997); Lilienthal, supra note 152; Linda
Kelly, Stories From the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered Immigrants in the Violence
Against Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 665 (1998); Espenoza, supra note 155; Teran, supra
note 152; Goldman, supra note 152.
189. Ann Moline, Bipartisan Women Made Anti-Violence Act Happen, http://www.
womensenews.com/article.cfn/dyn/aid/376/context/arichive (Dec. 18, 2000) (last visited
Jan. 16, 2004).
190. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 at §§ 1501-13. For comments on the
provisions of VAWA 2000 as they relate to immigrant women, see Leila Rothwell,
Comment, VAWA 2000's Retention of the "Extreme Hardship" Standard for Battered
Women in Cancellation of Removal Cases: Not Your Typical Deportation Case, 23 U. HAW.
L. REV. 555 (2001); Orloff& Kaguyutan, supra note 165; Lori Romeyn Sitowski, Congress
Giveth, Congress Taketh Away, Congress Fixeth Its Mistake? Assessing the Potential
Impact of the Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act, 19 LAW & INEQ. 259 (2001);
Orloff, supra note 165; Lauren Gilbert, Family Violence and U.S. Immigration Law: New
Developments, 01-03 IMMIGR. BRIEF 1 (2001); Deanna Kwong, Removing Barriers for
Battered Immigrant Women: A Comparison of Immigrant Protection under VA WA I & II,
17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 137 (2002).
191. For an in-depth analysis of all changes in the 2000 law, see Orloff &
Kaguyutan, supra note 165, at app. A.
192. 146 CONG. REC. S10,188, S10,192 (2000).
193. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,188, S!0,192 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act
of 2000 Section-by-Section Summary):
VAWA 2000 addresses the residual immigration law obstacles standing
in the path of battered immigrant spouses and children seeking to free
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After VAWA 2000, the spouse of a citizen or legal permanent resident
who has been abused or whose child has been abused by the citizen or
resident spouse during a marriage or an intended marriage 194 can self-
petition if she demonstrates the following: the marriage was entered into in
good faith, 95 she at some time lived with the abusive spouse, 196 and she is a
resident of the United States and a person of good moral character. 97 She
no longer has to show extreme hardship. She can be divorced from the
spouse if she self-petitions within two years of divorce and the marriage
termination is connected to the abuse.' 98 She can also self-petition within
two years of the loss of citizenship or permanent resident status of an
abusive spouse due to an incident of domestic violence.' 99 If the spouse
was a citizen, she can self-petition within two years of his death.2°°
Further, the law protects an intended spouse. The law recognizes
customary and common law marriages if recognized in the country or state
where they were celebrated and bigamous marriages that are the fault of the
abusive spouse. 20 The recognition of bigamous marriages, not the fault of
the immigrant spouse, also assists the abused who were not in bigamous
marriages, since proving the termination of an abuser's prior marriage
proved difficult for many abused spouses.2 °2
The law further expanded eligibility to self-petition beyond those
living in and subjected to abuse in the United States. The abused who are
currently residing abroad, but who had been subjected to abuse by a citizen
or resident spouse or parent in the United States are now included.2 °3 Also
included are spouses living outside the country who are abused by their
citizen or resident spouses employed by the United States government or
members of the U.S. uniformed services. 204 The law additionally extended
themselves from abusive relationships that either had not come to the
attention of the drafters of VAWA 1994 or have arisen since as a result
of 1996 changes to immigration law.
146 CONG. REC. S 10,188, S 10,192 (2000).
194. 8 U.S.C. §§ l154(a)(l)(A)(iii)(I)(bb), 1154(a)(1)(A)(iv), 1154(a)(l)(B)(ii)(1)
(bb), I 154(a)( I )(B)(iii), 11 54(a)( I )(A)(v)(I)(cc) (2000).
195. 8 U.S.C. §§ I 154(a)(l)(A)(iii)(l)(aa), I 154(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)(aa) (2000).
196. 8 U.S.C. §§ I 154(a)(l)(A)(iii)(II)(dd), I 154(a)(l)(B)(ii)(I)(dd) (2000).
197. 8 U.S.C. §§ II 54(a)(I)(A)(iii)(I)(bb), II 54(a)(I)(B)(ii)(II)(bb), (iii) (2000).
198. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(i)(A)(iii)(lI)(CC)(ccc), l154(A)(I)(B)(ii)(II)(CC)(bbb)
(2000).
199. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(I)(A)(iii)(Il)(CC)(bbb), 1154(a)(I)(B)(ii)(I)(CC)(aaa)
(2000).
200. 8 U.S.C. §§ I 154(a)(l)(A)(iii)(I)(aa)(CC)(aaa) (2000).
201. 8 U.S.C. § i 154(a)(l)(A)(iii)(I)(aa)(BB) (2000).
202. Orloff, supra note 165, at 146-48.
203. 8 U.S.C. § I 154(a)(l)(A)(iii)(I)(dd) (2000).
204. 8 U.S.C. § I 154(a)(1)(A)(v) (2000).
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relief to certain children who were battered themselves or who were the
children of battered immigrants.2 °5
The 2000 law also removed some impediments to legal status for the
abused that had been caused by changes in the general immigration laws.
Battered spouses and children of legal permanent residents, as well as
battered spouses and children of citizens, can now adjust their status to
legal permanent residents without leaving the United States.2 6 Battered
immigrants who received benefits made available under IRAIRA cannot
be barred from becoming legal residents because of the receipt of those
benefits.20 7 The 1996 law had made persons involved in domestic violence
deportable. Women who were abused found themselves subject to that
provision because of the functioning of the criminal justice system. 20 8 The
2000 law allows the INS and immigration judges to waive this ground for
deportation if the abused immigrant was not the primary perpetrator of
abuse and her crime did not result in serious bodily injury.2 °9
Self-petitioning for the abused was also extended by the 2000 law to
persons eligible under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American
Relief Act of 1997 and the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of
1998. Abused spouses and children of persons eligible for protections
under these acts can now self-petition.21
205. This included children of battered immigrants and battered children who had
previously been barred because they turned twenty-one before their applications could be
processed, 8 U.S.C. § I 154(a)(l)(D) (2000), and humanitarian parole for the children of the
abused granted cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(4) (2000).
206. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2000).
207. 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c) (2000). See Orloff, supra note 165, at 152-53.
208. See supra Part V.C.4 and infra notes 301-03.
209. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(7)(A) (2000).
210. The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997
(NACARA) and the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998 (HRIFA) provided
Haitians, Cubans, Nicaraguans, and El Salvadorans, among others who met certain criteria,
access to legal immigration status. Orloff, supra note 165, at 151. See generally Lourdes A.
Rodriguez, Understanding the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, 5
ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 501(1999); Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Thomas F. Muther, Jr.,
Immigration and Nationality, 33 INT'L LAW 517 (1999); Patrick E. Caldwell, NACARA:
Minator or Midas?, 53 SMU L. REV. 1559 (2000).
Under both NACARA and HRIFA, an alien who qualifies for relief may file a petition
to include a spouse or child to attain legal immigration status as well. Orloff, supra note
165, at 151. The problem quickly emerged, however, that abusive parents and spouses
would not choose to include their spouses or children in their applications for relief under
the Acts. Id. at 152. The abused spouses and children continued to be undocumented
without any option for recourse. Id. VAWA 2000 provided dependent spouses and children
who were qualified immigrants under NACARA and HRIFA and who met additional
specific requirements to self-petition under NACARA or HRIFA, in order to receive the
relief the acts provided. Id.
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The 2000 law also continued, and in some instances made easier,
cancellation of deportation for abused spouses of citizens or residents and
for parents of children abused by their other citizen or resident parents.2 '
However, the difficult to meet extreme hardship criteria still remains.22
Further, the 2000 statute created a status for victims of crimes who
have suffered substantial physical or mental abuse and who cooperate with
the investigation and prosecution of the crimes.21 3 Those who can benefit
from the law include victims of domestic violence, victims of trafficking,
and victims of abuse in the workplace if they meet the cooperation
214criteria. To be eligible, a person must be a victim of crime and possess
information about the crime, 2  as well as have a certification from an
official in the criminal justice system that verifies her assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of criminal activity.2t 6 The U status is a non-
immigrant status but it can be the basis for adjustment to lawful permanent
residency for those who continue to remain in the United States for three
years and whose continued presence is justified by humanitarian or public
217interest grounds. This status is therefore available to some women who
are abused, but who are not spouses of citizens or permanent residents,
such as spouses of non-immigrant visa holders and undocumented
immigrants.2t 8
211. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C)(iv) (2000).
212. Leila Rothwell, Comment, VA WA 2000's Retention of the "Extreme Hardship"
Standard for Battered Women in Cancellation of Removal Cases: Not Your Typical
Deportation Case, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 555 (2001).
213. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(U) (2000). See Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1513, 114 Stat. 1464, 1533-37 (2000). See
also 146 CONG. REC. SI0, 196 (daily ed. Oct.l 1, 2000).
214. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(lII) (2000); IGNATIUS, supra note 19.
215. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(U)(I)-(II) (2000).
216. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(o) (2000).
217. 8 U.S.C. § 1I84(o) (2000); IGNATIUS, supra note 19, at §§ 4:61-4:62.
218. See Gail Pendleton, Relief for Domestic Violence Survivors and for Victims of
Crimes: Update on VA WA 2000, Trafficking and U Visas, in IMMIG. & NAT'LITY L.
HANDBOOK 330 (Randy P. Auerbach ed., 2002-03); INS Disseminates Interim Procedures
for New "T" and "U" Nonimmigrant Status in Absence of Regulations, 78 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1751 (2001).
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VI. THE REMAINING LEGACIES OF COVERTURE
A. SPOUSAL CONTROL STILL REMAINS
The attempt to remove coverture based power and control from the
petitioning process was lost in the conference committee of VAWA 1994.
From that time on the focus shifted from removing power and control to
dealing with spouse abuse. The power to petition controls immigration
status and this control results in a control over living and working in this
country. The power to petition is a legacy of coverture because it gives one
spouse control over where the other spouse can live, whether that spouse
can work, and whether that spouse can live with and have custody of her
children. The coverture based power to petition is still a feature of the
conditional resident and initial petitioning law for spouses.
Coverture-like control still remains in the conditional resident scheme.
A spouse who is still married must demonstrate abuse, while a spouse who
has terminated the marriage need only show she entered the marriage in
good faith. There is no ability for a spouse who continues in a marital
relationship to simply demonstrate that she entered into the marriage in
good faith. If the marriage is intact, the alien spouse must be a victim of
abuse and a person of good moral character in addition.2t 9
Similarly, the initial petitioning process does not provide an
opportunity for a spouse to take the initiative to regularize her immigration
status by demonstrating that she entered into a good faith marriage. She
can self-petition only if she can demonstrate she or her child was battered
or subjected to extreme cruelty.
An argument can be made that utilizing control over immigration
status is a form of abuse and, therefore, appropriate interpretation of the
statutory term "extreme cruelty" would allow for self-petitioning by
women whose husbands will not file petitions. In the opinion of the Family
Violence Prevention Fund of San Francisco abuse includes: failing to file
papers to legalize immigration status, withdrawing or threatening to
withdraw papers filed for residency, threatening to report to INS to get a
spouse deported, and, threatening to withdraw the petition to legalize
immigration status. 220 However, neither the executive nor the judiciary has
interpreted the statute so broadly.
The applicable INS, now BCIS, regulation states in relevant part:
219. See supra note 98.
220. See Lauren Gilbert, Family Violence and U.S. Immigration Law: New
Developments, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, March 2001, at 33 n.14 (citing the Family Violence
Prevention Fund of San Francisco's Power and Control Wheel).
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For the purpose of this chapter, the phrase "was battered by
or was the subject of extreme cruelty" includes, but is not
limited to, being the victim of any act or threatened act of
violence, including any forceful detention, which results or
threatens to result in physical or mental injury.
Psychological or sexual abuse ... shall be considered acts
of violence. Other abusive actions may also be acts of
violence under certain circumstances, including acts that,
in and of themselves, may not initially appear violent but
that are a part of an overall pattern of violence.22'
This regulation may support an argument that extreme cruelty could
be found in a refusal to file a petition in the context of threats or behavior
that can be otherwise characterized as psychological abuse or as part of a
pattern that includes violence. It would not support the argument that mere
failure to file without other behavior is extreme cruelty.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit in Hernandez v. Ashcroft interpreted the
term "extreme cruelty. 222 In this case, over INS objection, the court found
that a spouse's contrite behavior in attempting to lure his wife back was
extreme cruelty because it was part of a pattern of abuse, which included a
cycle of violence and contrition. The court noted that the law protects a
woman against manipulative tactics aimed at ensuring the batterer's
dominance and control. However, the court also said "every insult or
unhealthy interaction in a relationship does not rise to the level of domestic
violence. 223 Therefore, there may be some possibility that extreme cruelty
can be shown through a husband's refusal to file a petition combined with
his insistence that his wife submit to his will through threats such as to
divorce her, report her to immigration authorities, or take her children
224away. However, it seems that there is no possible recourse for the
spouse subjected to power and control through her spouse's negligence or
refusal to file a petition. Legislative action was and is needed to make it
clear that the law will not sanction this type of spousal power, control, and
resulting subordination.
There was no legislative explanation about the rejection of proposals
to remove the power to petition from all spousal relationships (or at least
221. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) (2000) (providing petitions for relatives, widows,
widowers, and abused spouses and children).
222. 345 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2003).
223. Id.
224. See generally, Nooria Faizi, Domestic Violence in the Muslim Community, 10
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 209, 211 (2001).
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from longer term relationships, three years, as proposed). This, along with
the approach toward mail-order brides described below reflects an
ambiguity about finally rejecting the spousal power and control underlying
coverture.
The notion that the husband should be in charge and the wife should
be obedient still remains. A concept of marriage as a relationship between
two equal adults, each with the right to make choices about living, work,
and children, has not been fully accepted in this context. The shift to a
focus on battered women evidences some consensus that the law should not
be used as a tool for abuse. However, there does not seem to be the same
consensus that the law should not be used as a means of control.
Generally, condemning domestic violence has been less controversial
than confronting gender roles in marriage. 25 Law reform related to
domestic violence was initially based in the broader problem of gender
inequality, but it became unmoored from that approach.226 Equality of
gender roles in a family has been seen as threatening or unrealistic. For
some, this reflects a reaction to challenging "traditional" values of a wife as
focused on home and motherhood. For others, it reflects concern that
surface equality masks the need of women for special protection because of
their societal roles.227
In the spouse-based immigration context neither of these concerns is
valid. Allowing a spouse to take the initiative to petition to regularize her
immigration status does not undermine the personal choice about family
structure. It enhances the protection of women, rather than removing it. It
would remove the power and control vestige of coverture and make it clear
that the law should not enforce, reinforce, or permit subordination of one
person to another. Further, as explained more fully below, since domestic
violence is an extension of the notion of the coercive nature of marriage,
violence is promoted by lack of a clear policy that the law will not enforce
coercion of one spouse by another.
Some may argue that the legislative choice to continue the spousal
power over the petition reflects other concerns. These include policy
225. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 500
(1999); Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric,
81 VA. L. REV. 2181 (1995).
226. Symposium, Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking: Author Meets Readers
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Christine Harrington, Sally Engle Merry, Renje R6mkens, &
Marianne Wesson, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 313, 322 (2002).
227. See Bartlett, supra note 40, at 498. See also Martha Albertson Fineman,
Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law, 32 McGEORGE L. REV. 1031 (2001).
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objectives of family unity and fraud protection. The family unity objective
was expressed by one senator this way:
The only real purpose in giving the substantial immigration
benefit our laws provide to an alien spouse is to keep the
family together ...if the marriage just simply doesn't
work-for whatever reason-even when the alien spouse
is not at fault, there is no longer a family to "keep
together." Further, the immigration benefit which is lost to
the alien spouse if the marriage fails, for whatever reason,
was made available to that person only because of the
marriage to an American citizen or resident. When that
marriage no longer exists, there is no reasonable
justification for the special immigration benefit to
continue.228
The INS had also taken the position that a factually dead, but legally
alive marriage could not form the basis for immigration status for an alien
spouse.229 However, as explained above, this is not the current view of the
Board of Immigration Appeals or the courts. If a marriage is not a sham or
fraudulent from its inception, it is valid for immigration purposes, despite a
contention that the marriage is "factually dead. ' 3°
Moreover, this view, that the only appropriate policy objective is the
family reunification benefit to a citizen or resident, is analogous to the
coverture notion that the objective of a marriage was to promote a
husband's well being. Behind the family unity language lies the concept
that the marital relationship needs to serve the life choices of one spouse at
another's expense and that the law will enforce the spousal control
underlying those choices. It is reminiscent of other attempts to justify wife
subordination in the guise of other rationales.231
Further, the immigration law recognizes other situations in which
recognition of family relationship, not family unity, is the objective.
Amerasian children were allowed to petition to become permanent
residents without the participation of their American fathers.232 Widows,
228. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY
188 (3d ed. 1995) (citing 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1339 (1988)).
229. See, e.g., Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1979).
230. See supra note 36.
231. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
232. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(0 (2000). See Richard T. Mermelstein, Note, Welcoming
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and now the divorced and separated abused, are afforded legal immigration
status. 2 33 Allowing spouses in intact marriages to self-petition even has the
potential of promoting family unity by removing a source of tension in the
relationship.
Another concern is prevention of marriage fraud in the immigration
system.234 Yet representations about the degree of fraud do not have an
empirical base. In 1996, Congress stated that "the Immigration and
Naturalization Service estimates that the rate of marriage fraud between
foreign nationals and United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for
permanent residence is 8 percent." 235 However, in a 1999 report, the INS
stated, "Section 652 of IIRIRA attributed to INS an estimate that the rate of
marriage fraud is 8 percent; the source and accuracy of this estimate has
[sic] not been established. 236 In this report the INS attempted to assess the
degree of fraud by looking at the number of cases denied under the
conditional resident scheme of the Marriage Fraud Act. It found that in
1994, the last year for which detailed data were maintained, INS reviewed
96,033 applications for removal of conditional status and removed the
conditions on 90,243, or 94 percent."
"This means that 94 percent of the cases were judged to be valid
marriages. Most of the cases denied were for failure to pursue the
application to remove conditions. Only 717 of the 5,790 denied or closed
cases (twelve percent) were denied for cause. 237 Therefore the fraud rate
was twelve percent of the six percent denied, or under one percent (.7%).
Thus, the concern about marriage fraud in the immigration system
does not have a history of strong empirical support. Despite this, there is a
common belief that has entered our popular culture that some people marry
solely to gain immigration status. 238 Even accepting this concern, however,
does not lead to the conclusion that the power to petition has to continue.
Home our Children: An Analysis of the New Amerasian Immigration Law, 2 B.U. INT'L L. J.
299 (1983). See also MaryKim DeMonaco, Note, Disorderly Departure: An Analysis of the
United States Policy Toward Amerasian Immigration, 15 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 641 (1989).
233. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II)(cc)(bbb) (2000).
234. IGNATIUS, supra note 19, at §§ 4:26-4:32.
235. 8 U.S.C. § 1375(a)(5) (2000).
236. International Matchmaking, supra note 9. The assertions about marriage fraud
used to support the Marriage Fraud Act of 1986 also proved not to have a valid empirical
base. Calvo, supra note 1.
237. International Matchmaking, supra note 9.
238. Depiction of marriage fraud in the immigration system is apparent in today's
popular culture. Hollywood movies and television shows depict that people marry solely to
afford immigration status. For example, in the 1990 movie Green Card, a romantic comedy
about a marriage of convenience, Gerard Depardieu stars as an immigrant trying to obtain a
green card, aside Andie MacDowell, a single woman looking for a roommate. Depardieu, a
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The requirement that a citizen or permanent resident petition does not
especially prevent fraud. The citizen or resident could be the one
participating in fraud. Further, the law has dealt with the potential for fraud
more appropriately by making it a criminal offense or imposing evidentiary
requirements. Marriage fraud in the immigration context is already a
serious criminal offense, a felony punishable by five years in jail.239 In
other instances, the immigration law has dealt with special concerns about
marriage fraud by imposing evidentiary requirements.
For example, there has been a concern about an alien marrying solely
to achieve permanent resident status, divorcing, and then marrying another
for whom he then seeks legal permanent resident status. The concern that
Frenchman, has just been offered the job of his dreams in New York City, but cannot accept
the offer until he obtains a work permit or a green card. MacDowell has just found the
apartment of her dreams in New York City. The plot unfolds where a marriage of
convenience would solve both of their problems. A mutual friend sets them up and
Depardieu and MacDowell move in together in order to convince immigration officers that
they married for love. DigiGuide, Green Card (Film), at http://library.digiguide.com/lib/
programme/8635. The couple's silly efforts to convince officials of their love for each other
eventually leads to their truly falling in love. Desson How, Green Card, at
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-srv/stylellongtermlmovies/videos/greencardpg- I 3howe
_aOb2d3.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
Another example of marrying for the sake of obtaining immigration status is depicted
in an episode of the television series, Friends. The episode begins with the surprise that
Phoebe had married her friend Duncan, a gay Canadian ice dancer, to help him get his green
card. TV Tome, The One with Phoebe's Husband at http://www.tvtome.com/tvtome/
servlet/GuidePageServlet/showid-71/epid-372 (last visited Jan. 18, 2004). The episode
picks up six years later, when Duncan is back in touch with Phoebe because he wants a
divorce. It turns out that Duncan is not gay, and is getting married to someone else. Darcy
Partridge, The One with Phoebe's Husband at http://www.friends-tv.org/zz204.html (last
visited Jan. 18, 2004).
239. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2000); see also Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization
of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669
(1997). Congress has imposed criminal sanctions as well as deportation on undocumented
aliens who have committed marriage fraud. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2000). Criminal
sanctions imposed on those aliens who commit fraud include terms of imprisonment, fines,
and forfeiture of property. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (2000). Where spouses of United States
citizens and permanent resident aliens are given priority in gaining entry as a permanent
resident alien (8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a), (b)(2)(A)(i), 1152(a)(4), 1153(a), 1154(a) (2000)), the
intent and "good faith" of the parties must be evident at the time their marriage occurred,
Medina, supra, at 697, or both spouses will be subject to criminal prosecution for marriage
fraud. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2000). Congress imposed sanctions against marriage fraud
through the Immigration Fraud Amendments of 1986, Medina, supra, at 703, which were
codified as "[any individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the purpose of
evading any provision of the immigration laws shall be imprisoned for not more than 5
years, or fined not more than $250,000, or both." 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2000). It is more
common today, however, that those parties engaged in fraudulent marriages are deported or
denied an entry visa. Medina, supra, at 704.
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the first marriage was solely for immigration purposes is addressed by
requiring that the petitioning spouse has been a permanent resident for five
years 24° or clear and convincing evidence that demonstrates the good faith
nature of the first marriage.2 4' The suggested evidence includes birth
certificates of children, evidence of joint ownership of property or a joint
lease for an apartment and affidavits from persons having knowledge of the
nature of the relationship and who are willing to personally appear before
immigration authorities if called.242 The evidence suggested to demonstrate
that an abused immigrant entered into a good faith marriage is similar.243
Any concern with potential fraud with self-petitioning by a spouse could be
dealt with by imposing a length of marriage requirement or a standard of
proof requirement regarding the good faith nature of the marriage. 2"
So, in sum, it appears that the initial legislative proposals in this area
took the right approach. Even the modification to not allow self-petitioning
until the marriage is three years old reflected an understanding that the
underlying spousal power over immigration status had to be removed. The
failure to petition for a spouse evidences an inappropriate use of legally
sanctioned power, whether the failure is on purpose, out of passive
aggression, negligence or mere disorganization. Allowing the spouse to
take the initiative that affects her right to live and work and be with her
children in this country would remove the coverture-like power and control
that was initially established and continues to be sanctioned by law.
B. MAIL-ORDER BRIDES: AN INDUSTRY THRIVES ON SPOUSAL CONTROL
As reported by INS, the mail-order bride business is growing
rapidly.245 Many of the ads for these businesses promote women as
compliant, subservient, and non-feminist in contrast to "liberated"
American women. 246 A number of commentators have noted the racial and
240. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(2)(a)(i) (2000).
241. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
242. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(l)(i)(B) (2000). See also 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(l)(iii)(B)
(2000) (relating to evidence to demonstrate the bona fide nature of a marriage entered into
during proceedings).
243. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(vii) (2000).
244. The empirical basis for asserting marriage fraud does not exist, so basic self-
petitioning would be most appropriate. However, the notion that marriage fraud exists has
so entered our legal and popular culture that this is offered as an alternative. Requiring
either a certain length of marriage or a requirement of proof of the good faith nature of the
marriage would meet concerns about fraud.
245. International Matchmaking, supra note 9.
246. Lee, supra note 173, at 145-46.
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gender stereotyping of the foreign women, particularly Asian women, as
subservient and sexually compliant.247 Some have viewed the business as a
form of sexual exploitation that resembles international trafficking of
women, prostitution, and involuntary servitude, 248 and the marketing of
foreign women through the transformation of people into commodities.249
Others argue that the matchmaking aspect of the business fosters personal
private choice. Whatever the view, it must be noted that these businesses
operate in the context of the current spouse-based immigration laws which
still allow coverture-like power and control.
The 1996 statute required a study and report that addressed the
number of mail-order marriages, the extent of fraud and domestic abuse in
these marriages, the utilization of suspension of deportation or self-
petitioning on the basis of being abused, and the need for further regulation
and education.251 On July 16, 1997, the INS published an Advance Notice
247. See generally id.; Perez, supra, note 175; Christine S.Y. Chun, The Mail-Order
Bride Industry: The Perpetuation of Transnational Economic Inequalities and Stereotypes,
17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 1155 (1996); Ikemoto, supra note 177.
248. Lee, supra note 173, at 140.
249. See Chun, supra note 247; Kate O'Rourke, To Have And To Hold: A
Postmodern Feminist Response To The Mail-order Bride Industry, 30 DENy. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 476 (2002). One reported comment was that " 'bride futures could be one of the
commodities able to hold its value' even where gold, real property, and timber were deemed
likely to fail that year." Kathryn A. Lloyd, Wives For Sale: The Modern International Mail-
Order Bride Industry, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 341, 343 (2000).
250. Lloyd, supra note 249, at 350-51 (2000) (articulating the position of industry
consumers and companies).
251. 8 U.S.C. § 1375(c) (2000).
The Attorney General, in consultation with the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization and the Director of the Violence
Against Women Initiative of the Department of Justice, shall conduct a
study of mail-order marriages to determine, among other things-
(I) the number of such marriages;
(2) the extent of marriage fraud in such marriages, including an estimate
of the extent of marriage fraud arising from the services provided by
international matchmaking organizations;
(3) the extent to which mail-order spouses utilize section 1254a(a)(3) of
this title (providing for suspension of deportation in certain cases
involving abuse), or section 1 154(a)(l)(A)(iii) of this title (providing for
certain aliens who have been abused to file a classification petition on
their own behalf);
(4) the extent of domestic abuse in mail-order marriages; and
(5) the need for continued or expanded regulation and education to
implement the objectives of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
and the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 with respect
to mail-order marriages.
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of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) in the Federal Register with the stated
objective of gathering as much information as possible from divergent
sources. 252 Some of the information gathered was included in the INS
report issued in 1999.253 The resulting 1999 report left many issues
unanswered based on the assertion that the INS did not keep statistics in a
manner that could specifically address the congressional concerns.254
However, the INS did make some conclusions based on some gathered
information, a commissioned study, and some prior studies.
The report stated that the estimated number of mail-order marriages is
in the range of 4,000 to 6,000 yearly as of 1998 and that "the number of
businesses engaged in some aspect of the international matchmaking
industry is growing rapidly, potentially facilitated by the growth of the
Internet. 255  The report noted that there were polarized views of the
marriages that resulted from use of international matchmaking
organizations. One view asserts that the mail-order bride business is
merely a service used by consenting adults. 256 The other view associates
the business with the trafficking of women. 257 Overall, however, the report
concludes that, unlike dating services or personal ads, the mail-order bride
transaction is "one where the consumer-husband holds all the cards.
' 258
Comments received in response to the notice of rulemaking ranged
from individuals reporting positive and negative personal experiences, to
critiques of the industry as inherently abusive, to defenses by those
involved in matchmaking organizations. One comment in defense is
particularly telling about the perceived underlying social conflicts.
The overwhelming majority of the men who use such
services are sincerely wanting to find a woman with old
fashioned values to love and cherish .... The proposed
regulations are obviously a ploy of the feminists to
252. International Matchmaking Organization, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,041-42 (July 16,
1997).
253. International Matchmaking, supra note 9.
254. INS Reports to Congress on Mail-Order Brides, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 495
(March 29, 1999).
255. International Matchmaking, supra note 9.
256. Id. "At one end of the spectrum is the view that the mail-order bride business is
an international personal ad service used by 'consenting adults [and] competent people.'
Id.
257. Id. "The other end of the spectrum challenges the inequities of these
transactions and identifies the mail-order bride phenomenon as an international industry that
often traffics women from developing countries to industrialized Western countries." Id.
258. Id.
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eventually abolish such services. The feminists do not
want to see men happy. The INS should not be the puppet
to the feminists' strings (sic).
259
However, despite the range of comments, the report clearly found that
in these relationships there was an inherent power imbalance that carried
potential for abuse. 260 Further, the commissioned academic study attached
as an Appendix reviewed the literature in the area and found that the
previous studies concluded that, "American men seeking mail-order brides
have control in mind more than a loving, enduring relationship .... It is
apparent that power and control are critical for the men."26'
The mail-order bride business issue has not yet been resolved and
needs further legislative and administrative action. Commentators have
found that the choice of the specific type of action warranted is somewhat
difficult in this area for several reasons. The first is a practical one.
Internet based businesses can easily operate offshore and are therefore
difficult to regulate.262 The second concern is based in a respect for
individual private choice, both in the context of privacy in marital
relationships and in the context of respect for choice made by those who
have been subordinated in neo-colonial systems.263 The respect recognizes
that some make a "choice" some others would not make. One
commentator has raised the idea that within the notions of modern
marriage, marriage for immigration purposes may not only be an
understandable choice, but an acceptable one as well. 264 A third concern is
that restrictions will be imposed that will only make the difficulties of the
foreign brides more problematic.
259. International Matchmaking, supra note 9.
260. Id.
[W]ith the burgeoning number of unregulated international
matchmaking organizations and clients using their services, the potential
for abuse in mail-order marriages is considerable . . . . These are
relationships fostered by for-profit enterprises, where the balance of
power between the two individuals is skewed to empower the male
client who may be seen as "purchasing" a bride and a woman who has
everything to gain from entering into this arrangement and staying in it,
no matter what the circumstances.
Id.
261. Id. at app. A (citing Robert J. Scholes).
262. Margaret Chon, Radical Plural Democracy and the Internet, 33 CAL.W.L.REV.
143, 152 (1997). See generally Linda Kelly, Marriage for Sale: the Mail-Order Bride
Industry and the Changing Value of Marriage, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 175 (2001).
263. Chon, supra note 262; see generally Kelly, supra note 262.
264. See generally Kelly, supra note 262.
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Most commentators agree that the proposed information distribution
about immigration law to the women recruits would be somewhat
helpful. 265 Others believe that screening of the U.S. men for prior criminal
behavior, multiple mail-order marriages, or drug or alcohol addiction
should be required.266 Other suggestions are broader, such as United States
cooperation with countries like the Philippines that have attempted to
267 268regulate the industry, international regulatory approaches, subjecting
the mail-order bride industry to RICO enforcement 269 and the ultimate,
finding a way to diminish the economic disparity between have and have
270not countries.
Another attempt to address the mail-order bride business is pending in
Congress: the proposed International Marriage Broker Regulation Act of
2003.271 This proposal has several provisions. It would prevent a U.S.
265. Chun, supra note 247, at 1206; Lloyd, supra note 249, at 366; Markee, supra
note 173, at 294-95; Kelly, supra note 262.
266. Chun, supra note 247; Kelly, supra note 262.
267. Chun, supra note 247. Another suggestion has been that the United States, like
Australia, put a limit on the number of marriage related visas a U.S. citizen or resident may
request. Another proposal would require that all those receiving fiancee visas must have a
return ticket so that they can choose not to go through with a marriage and return home.
268. See generally Lloyd, supra note 249; Chun, supra note 247, at 1208; O'Rourke,
supra note 249.
269. Lee, supra note 173, at 140.
270. O'Rourke, supra note 249, at 497.
271. International Marriage Broker Regulation Act of 2003, H.R. 2949, 108th Cong.
(2003). The findings expressed in this proposal are:
(1) There is a substantial international marriage broker business
worldwide. A 1999 study by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
estimated that in 1999 there were at least 200 such companies operating
in the United States, and that as many as 4,000 to 6,000 persons in the
United States, almost all male, find foreign spouses through for-profit
international marriage brokers each year.
(2) Aliens seeking to enter the United States to marry citizens of the
United States currently lack the ability to access and fully verify
personal history information about their prospective American spouses.
(3) Persons applying for fianc6[e] visas to enter the United States are
required to undergo a criminal background information investigation
prior to the issuance of a visa. However, no corresponding requirement
exists to inform those seeking fianc6(e) visas of any history of violence
by the prospective United States spouse.
(4) Many individuals entering the United States on fiancr(e) visas for
the purpose of marrying a person in the United States are unaware of
United States laws regarding domestic violence, including protections
for immigrant victims of domestic violence, prohibitions on involuntary
servitude, protections from automatic deportation, and the role of police
and the courts in providing assistance to victims of domestic violence.
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citizen or resident from filing for more than one fiancde visa in any one
year time period. It requires that international marriage brokers collect
information about their U.S. clients and make that information available to
the prospective foreign spouses. The information includes: any arrest,
charge, or conviction record for homicide, rape, assault, sexual assault,
kidnap, or child abuse or neglect, any court ordered restriction on physical
contact with another person, including any temporary or permanent
restraining order or civil protection order; marital history, including if the
person is currently married, if the person has previously been married and
how many times, how previous marriages were terminated and the date of
termination, and if the person has previously sponsored an alien to whom
the person has been engaged or married and the ages of any and all children
under the age of 18. The proposal requires that prospective foreign spouses
be given information about U.S. immigration law, particularly those
provisions that provide options for abused spouses. The proposal would
also require that U.S. citizens or residents requesting fiancee visas undergo
criminal background screening and that the information be provided to
consular officials who would have the statutory obligation to reveal to the
prospective foreign fiancee any conviction or civil order for a crime of
violence, act of domestic violence, or child abuse or neglect of the U.S.
272intended spouse.
As valuable as some of the pending proposals may be, the
congressional concerns, the resulting administrative concern, and
suggestions for change miss an essential part of the issue. While the INS in
its report could not ascertain either the precise degree of abuse or fraud in
mail-order marriages, the power and control dynamics underlying the
relationships were clear. Removing the coverture-like spousal domination
and control from the spouse-based immigration system would undermine
the underlying basis for the difficulties without impinging on true personal
choice. Whatever the nature of relationships that individuals might choose,
the immigration law should not be the enforcement mechanism for an
arrangement based on submissiveness on one side and domination on the
other. If all spouses could self-petition and all conditional residents could
demonstrate their good faith in marriage, the legal imprimatur for
domination would cease. The legacy of coverture is not only spousal
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C. THE INSECURE DIMINISHING OF CHASTISEMENT
The focus on the abused in the context of immigration law over the
last decade has resulted in substantial changes in access to legal
immigration status and public assistance for the abused. The focus on the
issue of domestic violence resulted in legislation that dealt with child abuse
as well as spouse abuse. It has also resulted in a broadening of the concern
from abuse of the spouses of citizens and legal permanent residents to
abuse of spouses in derivative immigration statuses, as well as the abused
who are undocumented. Further, this focus has resulted in reforms that
deal with the practical realities of an abused spouse's life such as
authorization to work and the need for access to programs for battered
women.
273
However, there is a lingering concern about the legislative discontent
between abuse and underlying coercive spouse control, whether or not it
results in the extremes of physical abuse or extreme cruelty. First, there are
doubts that domestic violence can be removed without removing its
underlying basis of wife subordination. Chastisement is a notion developed
out of coverture, the idea that the husband could enforce his control
prerogatives. Legacies of chastisement can not be removed without
removing the power and control legacies of coverture, whether or not they
result in provable violence or cruelty.274
Second, there are concerns that a legislative focus on abuse without
addressing the underlying power and control issue allows promotion of
other agendas. In the nineteenth century, campaigns against abuse of
women were directed at "lower" class families (with some condescension).
They reflected the objective to "domesticate" the new immigrant
populations and not a concern with the subordination of wives.2 75
In this century, there has been a public recognition of the problem of
domestic abuse276 and to a degree, an acceptance of legal and social
responsibility for it. However, there have also been concerns about the
impact of current approaches to domestic violence on minority and
273. See Orloff, supra note 165; Orloff& Kaguyutan, supra note 165.
274. See ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING
(2000) (reaffirming the vision of violence and gender equality that originally underlay
advocacy for battered women); see also Elizabeth Schneider, et. al., Battered Women &
Feminist Lawmaking: Author Meets Readers, 10 J. L. & POL'Y 313 (2002).
275. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative, 105
YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
276. Natalie J. Sokoloff, Bibliographic References for MULTICULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE U.S., (Feb. 2002) available at
http://www.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/research/DomesticViolence (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
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culturally diverse populations . 77  For example, some have expressed
concerns that the criminalization of battering has promoted the increased
surveillance and incarceration of men (and women) of color.278 Further, the
programs instituted and protections afforded have not been as accessible to
women of color and women with cultural or language differences. 79
Moreover, paradoxically, the well intentioned focus on assisting the abused
has raised concerns about characterizing women as victims, thereby
allowing the notion that women deserve protection only if they are victims
and, moreover, what society views as good victims.
280
These concerns resonate in the context of abused immigrants. The
law that makes violation of an order of protection or conviction of crimes
related to domestic violence a basis for deportation results in threats of
deportation for the victims of abuse as well as abusers, and holds potential
for disparate impact in non-majoritarian communities. 281 Further, the lack
of services and shelters for women with language or culture differences
277. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Rivera, supra note
152; Ganatra, supra note 152; DeCasas, supra note 152; Marry Ann Dutton et al.,
Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources and Service Needs of Battered
Immigrant Latinas: Legal and Policy Implications, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 245
(2000); Mainstream Legal Responses to Domestic Violence vs. Real Needs of Diverse
Communities, Conference: Revolutions Within Communities: The Fifth Annual Domestic
Violence Conference, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 13 (2001); Markee, supra note 173.
278. Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis
of Race, National Origin and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231, 245-46
(1994); Elizabeth Schneider et al., Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking: Author Meets
Readers, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 313, 331-32 (2002) (referencing comments by Sally Merry). See
also Mainstream Legal Responses to Domestic Violence vs. Real Needs of Diverse
Communities, Conference: Revolutions Within Communities: The Fifth Annual Domestic
Violence Conference, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 13, 60 (2001) (panel discussion with
comments by Jenny Rivera).
279. Nooria Faizi, Domestic Violence in the Muslim Community, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN
& L. 209 (2001). See also Mainstream Legal Responses to Domestic Violence vs. Real
Needs of Diverse Communities, Conference: Revolutions Within Communities: The Fifth
Annual Domestic Violence Conference, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 13, 60 (2001) (panel
discussion with comments by Jenny Rivera). See Peter Margulies, Representation of
Domestic Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm of Poverty Law: In Search of Access,
Connection, and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071 (1995) (explaining the practical and
theoretical underpinnings of severe limitations on access to legal services for domestic
violence survivors).
280. Schneider et al., supra note 278; Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards'
Fathers and Good Victims: Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures
of Legal Images, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 557 (2000).
281. See infra notes 299-306.
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282particularly impacts on immigrant women. Moreover, gaining
exemption to the law's mandate of control over immigration status by
spouses requires a showing of victimhood. Abused immigrant spouses
must meet numerous criteria. They have to prove their "worth" through
substantial application processes and produce often difficult to obtain
evidence about cruelty and battering. Proving the good faith nature of a
marriage, even by a higher evidentiary standard would, for most, be an
easier task.
Tenacious advocates concerned about domestic violence fought for
changes made over the last decade. The advocates achieved great success
in a politically difficult context. However, despite the effort and the
substantial changes, the law is not totally free of the legacies of
chastisement. At the very least, immigration amendments focused on the
abused should be evaluated in the context of the expressed congressional
goals in addressing domestic violence.
In the history of the Violence Against Women Act, Congress
expressed goals that reflected its perception of the problem of domestic
violence. Congress wanted to effectively respond to the widespread and
growing national problem of domestic violence 283 by making a clear
statement that domestic abuse against women was wrong, and by
eliminating those parts of the legal system that sanctioned abuse by
promoting the arrest, prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of crimes
in the domestic context and by providing assistance to those who were the
survivors of domestic abuse. One way in which Congress sought to
achieve these goals was "by permitting battered immigrant women to leave
their batterers without fearing deportation. ' 28
Congress expressed the view that the country needed a "national
consensus that [our] society will not tolerate violence against women ' 285
and the terror that it spawns.286 In the congressional view, "Americans
need[ed] to brand these attacks as brutal and wrong., 287 Both the public
282. Dutton, supra note 277.
283. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 27 (1990); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993).
284. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25 (1993); see also id. at 38 (showing that Congress
was also concerned about the impact of the immigration law on child abuse. It recognized
that an abuser's control of the immigration status of the parent of an abused child would
inhibit the reporting of child abuse and the removal of the child from the abuser).
285. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41-42 (1993).
286. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102d Cong., VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA 26 (Comm. Print 1992).
287. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993).
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and those within the justice system needed education.288 Congress sought
to rectify a legal system that sanctioned spouse abuse.289
Congress also had the goal of punishing violent crimes against
women.290 It wanted to offer women the support and assurance that their
attackers will be prosecuted.2 9' The underlying attitude that this violence is
somehow less serious than other crimes had to be changed and the nation
had to recognize that these crimes must be taken as seriously as any other
assault.292 In the congressional view, stopping chronic violence required
taking domestic violence seriously and treating it like any other criminal
293assault, thereby requiring arrest and prosecution.
Congress further wanted to stop blaming and punishing the victims of
violence and provide aid and assistance for the abused. It wanted to
"concentrate on the conduct of the attacker rather than conduct of the
victim ''294 and reject the archaic prejudices that blame women for the
beatings they suffer.295 Further, Congress wanted to deter violent crimes
against women.
296
Does the current law related to immigrant spouses proclaim that abuse
is wrong and will not be legally sanctioned? The current law contains
options for those non-citizen women who are abused by citizen or resident
spouses or whose children are abused by citizen or resident parents. Those
abused by spouses in non-immigrant or undocumented status do not have
recourse other than the limited U visa. Moreover, success for spouses of
citizens or residents requires a detailed application process and the ability
to prove that the legal criteria are met. 9  Most abused women need
assistance, often a lawyer, to complete the application.298
288. H.R. REP. No. 103-138, at 25 (1993).
289. Id. at 36.
290. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25 (1993).
291. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
292. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 36 (1990).
293. Id. at 38.
294. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
295. Id.
296. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25 (1993).
297. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(H), 1229b(b)(2), 1186a(c)(4) (2000) (dictating an "any
credible evidence" standard for all VAWA applications).
298. Preparing an application for an abused spouse requires legal expertise. There
are several organizations that train lawyers, paralegals, and other advocates to assist abused
immigrants. For example, inMotion, an organization in New York (www.inmoitiononline.
org) has prepared an Immigration Self Petition Manual that it uses for training. The manual
(on file with the author) consists of about 200 pages. See also Gail Pendelton & Ann Block,
Applications for Immigration Status Under the Violence Against Women Act, IMMIGRATION
& NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK (2001-02 ed) (explaining the application process and
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Does the law assure the prosecution of abusers and provide aid for the
abused? By allowing the abused to control their immigration status, the
law does remove an impediment to seeking police assistance and pursuing
prosecution. However, ironically, the provision of the law making abusers
deportable has been a double-edged sword for the abused. Women who
have been victimized by their spouses sometimes get arrested when police
decide to arrest both parties and uninformed attorneys advise the abused to
accept a plea. Also, women who are victimized by abusive spouses and are
thereby unable to protect children from abuse wind up being deportable
because of convictions for child abuse or neglect.299
State court judges in the family law area faced with immense dockets
often issue restraining orders to both spouses without making a
determination of which spouse was the abuser. In the mode of "you stay
away from her and she will stay away from you," judges often encourage
spouses to accept concurrent restraining orders. However, an abused alien
spouse who does so puts herself in jeopardy of deportation. She can be
found in violation of a restraining order, even if she did not initiate contact
with her abuser.
300
Further, the criminal justice system also has realities and complexities
that cause concern that the abused spouse will wind up being arrested and
convicted within the terms of the immigration statute. Numerous states
have mandatory arrest policies that require arrest if there is any evidence of
an assault in a domestic violence situation. This approach, which was
initially intended to force officials to take domestic violence seriously, is
now controversial.3°'
There has been an increase of dual arrests in many jurisdictions. Even
when there are directives to arrest primary aggressors, abused women have
been arrested because distinctions are not made based on abused women
acting out of self-defense. This is exacerbated by mandatory prosecution
noting that preparing these applications requires expertise in domestic violence as well as
law). The USCIS website has information in a relatively easy to use format and provides
information about and copies of the applicable forms. See http://www.uscis.gov/graphics;
Margulies, supra note 279.
299. IGNATIUS, supra note 19, at 4-99. See also Espenoza, supra note 155, at 182-
91; Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving The Beatings of 1996, 11 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 303, 308-11, 316-21(1997).
300. Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving The Beatings of 1996, I1
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 303, 313-16 (1997).
301. Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis
of Race and Gender in Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L 171 (1994);
Symposium on Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1992); Joan Zorza,
Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?: Analysis and Policy Implications of New Police
Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEw ENG. L. REV 929 (1994).
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policies that limit a prosecutor's discretion to drop cases. These policies
put abused immigrant women in jeopardy for several reasons. First, an
immigrant woman with English language difficulties and unfamiliar with
U.S. systems may not be able to effectively communicate her position to
police officers while her American spouse will be seen as more credible.
Second, many immigrant women are members of minority communities
that have difficult relationships with police officers. Third, the arrest
possibilities can be used as a threat by the abuser, i.e. "if you call the police
against me, they will arrest you and you will be deported. 3 °2 The potential
for arrest and conviction under immigration terms is exacerbated by the
immigration definition of conviction, which can even include acceptance of
participation in a diversion program.3 °3
Further, the possibility of deportation of an abusive spouse often
inhibits an abused immigrant woman from seeking assistance. For an
abused spouse, particularly an abused immigrant spouse, there are personal
and cultural impediments to seeking assistance that threatens her abuser
with deportation. Personal concerns include those relating to children,
economic welfare, and fear for safety. Reporting an abuser and enabling
his deportation means depriving the family of the spouse's economic
contribution, being the source of the deportation of your children's father
or antagonizing an already violence prone person to retributive behavior.3°
Further, as one commentator has pointed out, abused spouses have shared
an intimate relationship with their abusers; love and emotional attachment
underlie these types of relationships; the abused often don't want to harm
the abuser; they just want the abuse to stop, and they harbor hope that the
abuser can reform.3 °5  Cultural prohibitions are also complicated. An
abused woman may feel responsible for her marriage, her family and her
community in a way that makes exposing domestic violence and prompting
her spouse's deportation an unthinkable disloyal and humiliating act that
can subject her to being ostracized in her extended family, her
neighborhood, and her community.
3°6
Further, in the post 9/11 world, there is additional difficulty for
immigrant women who are abused in the context of their relationship with
302. Espenoza, supra note 155, at 182-91.
303. Id. at 180-81.
304. Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving The Beatings of 1996, 11
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 303, 316-21 (1997).
305. See Espenoza, supra note 155, at 182-89; Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence
Survivors: Surviving The Beatings of 1996, I1 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 303, 308-11, 316-21
(1997).
306. Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving The Beatings of 1996, 11
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 303, 308-310 (1997). Espenoza, supra note 155, at 205-10 (1999).
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law enforcement. Local law enforcement is under increasing pressure to
participate in enforcing immigration laws despite local resistance. °7 Many
local law enforcement offices and some cities had policies30 8 not to inquire
into the citizenship status of those who had been a crime victim or
witness. °9 States and localities supported and implemented a community
policing approach that sought to gain the trust of immigrant residents and
307. Michael J. Wishnie, Migration Goes Local: The Role of States in U.S.
Immigration Policy, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L 283, 287 (2002).
308. See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1999)
(challenging, unsuccessfully, the constitutionality of federal statutes that preempted a city
executive order restricting the dissemination of information about aliens immigration
status).
309. See the revised New York City policy, in relevant part, entitiled New York City
Mayor Blumberg's Executive Order 41, September 17, 2003, City-Wide Privacy Policy and
Amendment of Executive Order No. 34 Relating to City Policy Concerning Immigrant
Access To City Services:
Section 2. No City officer or employee shall disclose confidential
information, unless
(d) in the case of confidential information other than information
relating to immigration status, such disclosure is necessary to fulfill the
purpose or achieve the mission of any City agency; or
(e) in the case of information relating to immigration status, (i) the
individual to whom such information pertains is suspected by such
officer or employee or such officer's or employee's agency of engaging
in illegal activity, other than mere status as an undocumented alien or
(ii) the dissemination of such information is necessary to apprehend a
person suspected of engaging in illegal activity, other than mere status
as an undocumented alien or (iii) such disclosure is necessary in
furtherance of an investigation of potential terrorist activity ....
Section 3. Information respecting aliens.
a. A City officer or employee, other than law enforcement officers, shall
not inquire about a person's immigration status unless:
(1) Such person's immigration status is necessary for the
determination of program, service or benefit eligibility or the provision
of City services; or
(2) Such officer or employee is required by law to inquire about
such person's immigration status.
Section 4. Law Enforcement Officers.
a. Law enforcement officers shall not inquire about a person's
immigration status unless investigating illegal activity other than mere
status as an undocumented alien.
b. Police officers and peace officers, including members of the Police
Department and the Department of Correction, shall continue to
cooperate with federal authorities in investigating and apprehending
aliens suspected of criminal activity.
c. It shall be the policy of the Police Department not to inquire about the
immigration status of crime victims, witnesses, or others who call or
approach the police seeking assistance.
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encourage them to report crimes and serve as witnesses. 310 Post 9/11 anti-
immigration rhetoric and action undermined the community policing
objectives.1 Some localities are still attempting to walk a narrow line
between complying with federal law prohibiting local restrictions on
dissemination of information to immigration authorities 312 and promoting a
law enforcement approach that allows effective policing in immigrant
mm' 3communities.
Proposed federal legislation, however, declares the authority of state
and local law enforcement to enforce civil federal immigration laws and
penalizes states and localities whose police do not enforce these laws or
collect and report information about immigration violators. This proposal,
HR 2671, the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act
(CLEAR Act) 314 as of this writing has 116 legislative supporters.
31 5
This proposed federal legislation illustrates the lack of congressional
recognition of and commitment to addressing the crime of spouse abuse.
One of the main purposes behind the Violence Against Women Acts in
1994 and 2000 was to make it possible for women and children who were
victims of crimes to be able to report these crimes to law enforcement.
Abusers often told their victims they would be deported and never see their
children again if they reported the abuse to the police. Studies showed that
the fear of deportation prevented high percentages of battered immigrants
from contacting law enforcement about the abuse.3 16
In the current climate, there is no mention in the proposed legislation
or the statements in support of the proposals of the relatively recently
passed provisions of Violence Against Women Act. There is not even a
sense that legislators have considered the recent laws that had the purpose
of promoting reporting and prosecution of crimes, and after consideration
determined that these goals had to be sacrificed for other more important
310. Muzaffar A. Chishti, Migration Goes Local: The Role of States in U.S.
Immigration Policy, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 371-74 (2002).
311. Id. at 373.
312. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2000).
313. See New York City policy supra note 309.
314. H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003).
315. The Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress:
H.R.2671, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 108:HR02671 : @ @ @P (last visited
Feb. 5, 2004).
316. Mary Ann Dutton et al., Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources
and Service Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas: Legal and Policy Implications, 7 GEO J.
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 245 (2000). See also HOWARD A. DAVIDSON, THE IMPACT OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION (Howard A. Davidson ed., American Bar Association Center on Children and
the Law 1994).
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public objectives. The arrest and prosecution objectives in the context of
spouse abuse are completely ignored.
The proposed CLEAR Act illustrates that the removal of chastisement
does not have a strong legislative commitment. As one advocate has
stated, "If Congress passes this law, it may as well repeal the VAWA
immigration provisions (self-petitioning and VAWA cancellation) and the
U and T visas. 317 The hard fought for legislative changes that addressed
spouse abuse against non-citizen women in 2000 are extremely vulnerable.
This is reminiscent of the legislative activity after the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994. Legislation enacted two years later in 1996 with
immigration control and budgetary objectives undermined the 1994
provisions. This was despite an extensive legislative consideration over a
number of years of the detriments of spouse abuse to its victims, children,
law enforcement, health care and society as a whole. New legislation had
to be passed in 2000 to address the problems created. Current attempts to
use local law enforcement for immigration control purposes undermine the
legislation that was just passed three years ago and has yet to be fully
implemented.318 It is clear that rejecting the notions of chastisement is not
firmly in the legislative consciousness. Thus, the law continues to condone
violence and the underlying gender inequality.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite more than a decade of legislative advocacy and action,
spouse-based immigration still carries the underpinnings of coverture and
chastisement. There has not been a legislative rejection of the notion of
spousal control that underlies coverture. Further, rejection of the concept
of chastisement is not firm; it slips in and out of the legislative
consciousness and gets sacrificed to other objectives. While there have
been significant legislative changes that address the plight of some battered
immigrant spouses, these changes are extremely vulnerable. Succeeding
legislative proposals threaten to seriously undermine the changes made.
The rejection of chastisement is not a firm legislative priority and, even
worse, easily disappears from the legislative agenda. This undermines the
extensively stated legislative goals of recognizing that domestic violence is
317. Telephone interview with Sally Kinoshita, Staff Attorney, Immigrant Legal
Resource Center.
318. INS Disseminates Interim Procedures for New "T" and "U" Nonimmigrant
Status in Absence of Regulations, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1751 (2001); Gail Pendleton,
Relief for Domestic Violence Survivors and for Victims of Crimes: Updates on VA WA 2000,
Trafficking and U Visas, IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK (2002-03 ed.).
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wrong and finally ridding the legal system of the sanctioning of spouse
abuse. Legacies of coverture still remain. The law thereby continues to
perpetuate women's inequality by enforcing the exercise of power control
and domination by a spouse.

